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NO TOY FOR YOU!  THE HEALTHY FOOD 
INCENTIVES ORDINANCE:  PATERNALISM 
OR CONSUMER PROTECTION? 
ALEXIS M. ETOW* 
The newest approach to discouraging children’s unhealthy eating habits, amidst 
increasing rates of childhood obesity and other diet-related diseases, seeks to ban 
something that is not even edible.  In 2010, San Francisco enacted the Healthy Food 
Incentives Ordinance, which prohibits toys in kids’ meals if the meals do not meet 
certain nutritional requirements. 
Notwithstanding the Ordinance’s impact on interstate commerce or potential 
infringement on companies’ commercial speech rights and on parents’ rights to 
determine what their children eat, this Comment argues that the Ordinance does not 
violate the dormant Commerce Clause, the First Amendment, or substantive due 
process.  The irony is that although the Ordinance likely avoids the constitutional 
hurdles that hindered earlier measures aimed at childhood obesity, it intrudes on civil 
liberties more than its predecessors.  This Comment analyzes the legality of the Healthy 
Food Incentives Ordinance to understand its implications on subsequent legislation 
aimed at combating childhood obesity and on the progression of public health law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A colleague told us of her four-year-old daughter at the 
supermarket seeing Betty Crocker’s Disney Princess Fruit Snacks 
with Cinderella, Snow White, and the Little Mermaid on the box. 
Daughter:  “I want that.” 
Mother:  “What is it?” 
Daughter:  “I don’t know.”1 
As the anecdote above portrays, children are heavily influenced by 
the food industry’s commercial tactics without even realizing it.2  
Recognizing children’s lucrative vulnerability, fast food marketers 
spend over $660 million each year on sales strategies that directly 
target children as young as three years old.3  These marketing 
practices combined with the prevalence of unhealthy foods in 
supermarkets and fast food restaurants have contributed to alarming 
trends in children’s health.4  Fast food restaurants have commonly 
been named one of the primary culprits for providing high-calorie, 
low-nutrient foods that come with excessive sodium and saturated fat, 
which lead to obesity and other diet-related diseases.5  Not only are 
more meals consumed outside the home today, but children 
consume almost twice as many calories when they eat out.6 
                                                          
 1. KELLY D. BROWNELL & KATHERINE BATTLE HORGEN, FOOD FIGHT 107 (2004). 
 2. See Tracy Westen, Government Regulation of Food Marketing to Children:  The 
Federal Trade Commission and the Kid-Vid Controversy, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 79, 79 (2006) 
(revealing that children do not understand that marketing techniques are 
commercially motivated). 
 3. JENNIFER L. HARRIS ET AL., YALE RUDD CTR. FOR FOOD POLICY, FAST FOOD 
F.A.C.T.S.:  EVALUATING FAST FOOD NUTRITION AND MARKETING TO YOUTH 12 (2010), 
available at http://fastfoodmarketing.org/media/FastFoodFACTS_Report.pdf. 
 4. See James O. Hill et al., Modifying the Environment to Reverse Obesity, 2005 ENVTL. 
HEALTH PERSP. 108, 109 (asserting that marketing unhealthy foods directly to 
children is a contributing factor to today’s rising obesity rates). 
 5. See Jonathan Berr, Lawsuit Threat:  McDonald’s Happy Meal Toys Make Kids Fat, 
DAILYFINANCE.COM  
(June 22, 2010, 5:20 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2010/06/22/mcdonalds-
happy-meal-toys-lawsuit/ (noting that some health experts hold McDonald’s and 
other fast food purveyors partly culpable for America’s obesity epidemic); see also 
HARRIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 128 (explaining that over thirty percent of fast food 
calories consist of sugar and saturated fat—empty calories that far surpass children’s 
daily recommended caloric intake).  Childhood obesity rates have nearly tripled in 
the past thirty years, and diet-related diseases such as hypertension, heart disease, 
high cholesterol, and type 2 diabetes have similarly skyrocketed.  See INST. OF MED., 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTIONS TO PREVENT CHILDHOOD OBESITY 1 (2009) (reporting 
that the high prevalence of childhood obesity is likely to decrease the life expectancy 
and quality of life for today’s generation of children). 
 6. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 116 (finding that of the 689 sampled 
parents with children two to eleven years old, sixty-six percent took their children to 
McDonald’s on at least a few occasions a month, and twenty-two percent went at least 
once a week); Devon E. Winkles, Comment, Weighing the Value of Information:  Why the 
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In response to these pressing diet-related concerns, the law can be 
a powerful and necessary tool for protecting children’s health.7  
Equally important is our constitutional framework, which ensures 
that these legal strategies do not unjustifiably infringe upon civil 
liberties.8  Constitutional safeguards played a central role in 
hampering early attempts to combat childhood obesity, such as 
efforts to eliminate advertisements targeting child audiences.9  As a 
result, some states and municipalities have turned to developing new 
and more innovative ways to address childhood obesity and diet-
related illnesses.10 
In 2010, Santa Clara County and the city of San Francisco made 
history by passing the first-ever local ordinances that prohibit 
restaurants from providing free toys in meals for children that do not 
meet established nutritional requirements.11  Despite well-intentioned 
interests, the ordinances have generated substantial concerns and 
criticism from the food industry and members of the public who 
accuse San Francisco and Santa Clara County of creating the ultimate 
“nanny state”—telling children they cannot have a toy unless “they 
eat their fruits and vegetables.”12  Even former Mayor Gavin Newsom 
of San Francisco opposed the ban, alleging that it inappropriately 
interferes with the role of parents who have the ultimate right and 
                                                          
Federal Government Should Require Nutrition Labeling for Food Served in Restaurants, 59 
EMORY L.J. 549, 552 (2009) (revealing that while children consume an average of 420 
calories when they eat a meal at home, they consume an average of 770 calories 
when they eat out). 
 7. See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW:  POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 29 
(2d ed. 2008) (claiming that public health law can offer “innovative solutions to the 
most implacable health problems”).  Lawrence Gostin delineates seven ways that the 
government or private citizens can protect the public’s health through the law, 
including:  taxation; alteration of the informational environment, built environment, 
or socioeconomic environment; direct regulation; indirect or tort regulation; and 
deregulation.  See id. at 29–38 (warning that while each of these tools may be highly 
beneficial to the public health, they often raise social, ethical, and legal concerns 
that require thorough attention and analysis).  
 8. See Richard A. Epstein, Let the Shoemaker Stick to His Last:  A Defense of the “Old” 
Public Health, 46 PERSP. IN BIOLOGY & MED. S138, S149 (2003) (articulating that the 
“hard question” is determining what forms of public intervention are allowable when 
protected liberty interests are at stake). 
 9. See Westen, supra note 2, at 86 (discussing the difficulty in creating 
regulations that only affect advertisements that “deceive” young children). 
 10. See INST. OF MED., supra note 5, at 3–4 (suggesting that local governments can 
improve community food access and establish public programs to combat obesity). 
 11. S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471. to .9 (2011), available at 
http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sfrancisco.shtml (follow “Health Code” 
hyperlink; then follow “Article 8:  Food and Food Products” hyperlink); SANTA CLARA, 
CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § A18-352 (2010). 
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responsibility to determine their children’s food choices.13  These 
concerns over the paternalistic nature of the ordinances, coupled 
with the ordinances’ unprecedented approach to countering 
childhood obesity, raise two critical questions:  (1) whether such a 
regulation would survive challenges under the dormant Commerce 
Clause, and commercial speech and substantive due process 
doctrines;14  and, (2) if so, what its implications would be on future 
attempts to regulate childhood obesity.15 
This Comment argues that, unlike earlier attempts to curtail 
childhood obesity, San Francisco’s Healthy Food Incentives 
Ordinance (Healthy Food Ordinance or the Ordinance) avoids the 
constitutional challenges that thwarted its predecessors, yet is 
ironically more indicative of paternalistic overreach.  Not only is the 
Ordinance more invasive than prior attempts to regulate children’s 
diets, but it also sets the table for increased government intervention 
to determine what children eat.16  The constitutionality and 
permissibility of the Healthy Food Ordinance, therefore, commands 
further legal inquiry because of its far-reaching implications, not only 
on nationwide efforts to combat obesity, but also pertaining to the 
future of public health law.17 
                                                          
 13. Consumers opposed to the Ordinance have also voiced this concern.  See 
Edward Abramson, The End of the Happy Meal?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Dec. 27, 2010), 
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/its-not-just-baby-fat/201012/the-end-the-
happy-meal (reasoning that part of the public outcry stems from parents feeling that 
the Ordinance calls into question their parenting abilities); see also Berr, supra note 5 
(contending that blaming fast food restaurants for childhood obesity wrongly 
absolves parents of the duty to tell their children “no”). 
 14. See Happy Meals Banned in Santa Clara County, California, LEGAL BITES (May 3, 
2010, 1:14 PM), http://www.nkms.com/legalbites/index.php/2010/05/happy-
meals-banned-in-santa-clara-county-california/ (raising dormant Commerce Clause 
concerns because the toy bans will be unduly burdensome for nationwide 
restaurants); Rachel Gordon, Plan to Limit Toys with Meals Faces First Test, S.F. CHRON., 
at A-1 (citing the industry’s Free Speech allegations); Jonathan Turley, San Francisco 
Bans Happy Meals and Other Fast-Food Meals Served with Toys, JONATHANTURLEY.ORG 
(Nov. 12, 2010),  http://jonathanturley.org/2010/11/12/san-francisco-bans-happy-
meals-and-other-fast-food-meals-served-with-toys/ (indicating potential due process 
claims).  
 15. See infra Part III (discussing the Ordinance’s immediate and potential 
impacts). 
 16. In August 2000, New Mexico state officials took a three-year-old child into 
state custody after her parents failed to treat her obesity.  Shireen Arani, Comment, 
State Intervention in Cases of Obesity-Related Medical Neglect, 82 B.U. L. REV. 875, 875–78 
(2002).  This concept of treating childhood obesity as parental abuse, combined with 
the Healthy Food Ordinance’s grant of broad authority to the government to dictate 
what children should eat, raises significant concerns. 
 17. Although this Comment does not delve into the policy implications of the 
Healthy Food Ordinance, the Ordinance epitomizes the modern trend in public 
health regulation that has prompted criticism from legal commentators like Richard 
Epstein.  Epstein contends that the government’s authority to regulate health-related 
concerns should be limited to communicable diseases.  See Epstein, supra note 8, at 
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Part I of this Comment begins by exploring the impetus behind the 
Healthy Food Ordinance, specifically the role of the government and 
food industry’s past struggles to develop effective anti-obesity 
strategies.  It then discusses the enactment of the Healthy Food 
Ordinance, which provides a new, more invasive approach to 
combating childhood obesity than previously attempted.  Part I ends 
by summarizing the background of the constitutional doctrines 
implicated by the Ordinance—the dormant Commerce Clause, 
commercial speech, and substantive due process. 
Part II analyzes the legality of the Ordinance under the three 
constitutional doctrines introduced in Part I.  First, it demonstrates 
that the Ordinance does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause 
because the nutritional requirements are not unduly burdensome.  
Second, it delves into the question of whether the Ordinance 
constitutes a restriction on commercial speech and argues that, even 
if it does, it would survive intermediate scrutiny.  Third, it contends 
that substantive due process is the most appropriate doctrinal tool to 
address the public’s concerns over the paternalistic nature of the 
Ordinance but concludes that this doctrine does not pose any 
substantial threat to the Ordinance. 
Finally, Part III discusses the implications of the Ordinance, 
focusing on companies’ changes to their marketing practices in 
response to the Ordinance and on steps cities wishing to implement a 
similar law might take to ensure fast food companies do not evade 
the Ordinance’s directives.  Part III concludes by discussing the 
repercussions of our current constitutional framework under the Due 
Process Clause, which, in its attempt to balance civil liberties and 
government interests, permits the implementation of increasingly 
innovative—and intrusive—public health regulations. 
                                                          
S139 (asserting that under the “new” public health regime, obesity is misleadingly 
referred to as an “epidemic,” to justify government coercion).  According to Epstein, 
“[t]here are no non-communicable epidemics.”  Id. at S154.  Under the traditional 
or “old” public health model, only communicable diseases, which have a singular and 
definitive source, justified direct government intervention.  Id. at S141.  The key 
question to determine whether something constitutes a public health epidemic that 
requires government regulation is whether there is a system of private rights in place 
to protect individuals.  Id. at S143.  Under this theory, obesity would not constitute a 
true epidemic because tort remedies are available.  Id. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Impetus for the Healthy Food Ordinance 
1. Early government efforts aimed at childhood obesity 
Regulatory attempts to restrict junk food marketing targeting 
children started over a quarter-century ago.  In 1978, the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) tried to promulgate a regulation that 
limited children’s exposure to advertisements promoting junk food.18  
The FTC relied on empirical data indicating that children have not 
yet developed the same cognitive abilities to differentiate commercial 
advertising or to understand its persuasive function.19  Among other 
restrictions, the proposed regulation sought to:  “Ban all televised 
advertising for any product which is directed to, or seen by, audiences 
composed of a significant proportion of children who are too young 
to understand the selling purpose of or otherwise comprehend or 
evaluate the advertising.”20 
One of the major challenges the FTC encountered, however, was 
determining which television shows to target.  As the FTC discovered, 
I Love Lucy was young children’s favorite show, making it difficult to 
implement this regulation without also limiting adults’ exposure to 
advertisements.21  Moreover, a restriction on all advertisements 
during children’s programming was excessive and highly contested 
by both the food industry and television networks.22  These legal 
obstacles, combined with political opposition, forced the FTC to 
abandon its proposed regulation.23  As a result, the food industry’s 
                                                          
 18. See Westen, supra note 2, at 79 (characterizing the proposed regulations as 
“the most radical agency initiative ever conceived” at the time). 
 19. See id. at 81 (“To a very young child, a Tony the Tiger commercial came 
across as follows:  ‘Hi, I’m Tony the Tiger . . . .  I’m your friend, and I want you to eat 
Sugar Frosted Flakes because I want you to grow up to be big and strong like me.’”). 
 20. The two other proposals aimed to: 
(b) Ban televised advertising for sugared food products directed to, or seen 
by, audiences composed of a significant proportion of older children, the 
consumption of which products poses the most serious dental health risks; 
(c) Require televised advertising for sugared food products not included in 
Paragraph (b), which is directed to, or seen by, audiences composed of a 
significant proportion of older children, to be balanced by nutritional 
and/or health disclosures funded by advertisers. 
43 Fed. Reg. 17,967, 17,969 (Apr. 27, 1978). 
 21. Westen, supra note 2, at 86. 
 22. See id. at 85 (reasoning that a complete ban on advertisements during 
Saturday morning television would leave networks without any sponsorships, thereby 
creating a disincentive for children’s programming). 
 23. See id. at 84 (explaining that when President Reagan was elected in 1980, he 
appointed a new head of the FTC, who opposed the rule, thereby preventing its 
enactment); id. at 86 (delineating some of the substantive problems that hampered 
the proceeding, such as being unable to narrowly tailor the regulation so that it only 
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marketing ventures today are primarily self-regulated.24 
2. The food industry’s role:  allowing the fox to guard the henhouse 
Many of the kids’ meals offered at fast food restaurants today far 
exceed the nutritional limits recommended by experts.25  While the 
Institute of Medicine recommends that elementary school-age 
children consume no more than 650 calories and 636 milligrams of 
sodium in a fast food meal,26 a standard McDonald’s Happy Meal 
containing a cheeseburger, small fries, and low-fat chocolate milk jug 
contains 700 calories, 1060 milligrams of sodium, and 27 grams of 
fat.27  Although some fast food chains recently pledged to advertise 
only “better-for-you”28 choices to children, and in fact began offering 
healthier options such as fruits, vegetables, and low-fat milk, some 
health advocates criticize these efforts as insufficient.29  Prior to the 
passage of the Healthy Food Ordinance, studies revealed that 
healthier options were not provided unless specifically requested.30  
Instead, fast food chains like McDonald’s and Burger King would 
serve French fries as the default side dish in kids’ meals at least 
eighty-six percent of the time and soft drinks at least fifty percent of 
                                                          
restricted children’s exposure to junk food advertisements and not adults’ 
exposure). 
 24. The Obama administration recently created the Interagency Working Group 
on Food Marketing to Children, which has proposed voluntary guidelines to improve 
the industry’s self-regulation efforts.  See Julian Pecquet, Chamber of Commerce Assails 
Proposed Food Marketing Restrictions, HEALTH WATCH:  THE HILL’S HEALTH CARE BLOG 
(June 30, 2011, 11:53 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch (contending that 
even though the proposed recommendations would be voluntary, they have still 
received criticism for “hav[ing] a chilling effect on commercial speech”). 
 25. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 47 (defining “kids’ meals” as fast food 
combinations specifically designed for children that consist of a main dish, side, 
beverage, and usually a toy or other premium). 
 26. Meanwhile, 410 calories and 544 milligrams of sodium are the acceptable 
ceilings for preschool-age children.  Id. 
 27. See MCDONALD’S, NUTRITION INFORMATION FOR MCDONALD’S HAPPY MEALS 3 
(2011).  These numbers reflect the nutrition information of Happy Meals prior to 
the menu changes that McDonald’s made in July 2011.  See infra Part III.C (discussing 
the efforts made by McDonald’s to improve the wholesomeness of its Happy Meals). 
 28. See C.L. PEELER ET AL., THE CHILDREN’S FOOD AND BEVERAGE ADVERTISING 
INITIATIVE IN ACTION:  A REPORT ON COMPLIANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION DURING 2008, at 
19 (2009), available at http://www.bbb.org/us/storage/0/Shared%20Documents/ 
finalbbbs.pdf (outlining the voluntary pledge made by McDonald’s and Burger King 
to only advertise their healthier offerings). 
 29. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 3, at ix (suggesting that these “better-for-you” 
television ads do not actually encourage healthier eating, but instead focus on 
promoting the toys themselves and attaining brand loyalty); id. at 129–30 (pointing 
out that restaurants could more effectively increase the sale of healthier items by 
promoting them more inside the restaurant). 
 30. See id. at 112 (finding that nearly all fast food restaurant employees serve soda 
and French fries as the default options in kids’ meals). 
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the time.31  Only eleven percent of parents ordered healthier sides, 
and a reported eighty-eight percent of parents claimed they were 
unaware of these more wholesome options.32  Additionally, these 
“better-for-you” products were often merely added as part of the 
backdrop in advertisements.33  Therefore, despite the industry’s 
seemingly commendable attempts at self-regulation, these methods 
were ultimately ineffective.34 
3. The use of toys to attract child consumers 
Marketers and sociologists alike identify children as “surrogate 
salesmen,” capable of convincing their parents through “pester 
power” to buy them what they want.35  For fast food restaurants, the 
most lucrative tool for attracting child consumers are the free toys in 
kids’ meals, which receive the largest portion—$360 million—of 
child-oriented marketing expenditures.36  From Transformers to 101 
Dalmations,37 successful toy promotions have doubled or tripled the 
weekly sales of kids’ meals.38  In 1997, an estimated four Happy Meals 
were sold for every child in the United States between the ages of 
                                                          
 31. Id. at 112–13. 
 32. Christina Rexrode, Happy Meals Change to Apples, Fewer Fries, WASH. TIMES (July 
27, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jul/27/happy-meals-
change-to-apples-fewer-fries/; see HARRIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 113 (noting that soda 
is still the most popular beverage ordered in kids’ meals and that only eight percent 
of parents request plain milk instead of soda, juice, or flavored milk for their 
children). 
 33. Instead, advertisements focused on the enticing appeal of the restaurant itself 
and its toy offerings.  HARRIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 59–60. 
 34. But see Emily Bryson York, Happy Meal Suit Raises More than Food, Marketing 
Questions, CHI. TRIBUNE (Dec. 15, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-12-
15/business/ct-biz-1216-mcd-suit-20101215_1_corporate-accountability-international-
ban-toys-ronald-mcdonald (quoting Dawn Jackson Blatner, a dietician and 
spokeswoman for the American Dietetic Association, who acknowledged that 
McDonald’s Happy Meals have “come a long way” from their unwholesome past). 
 35. See ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION 43 (2001) (identifying the goal of 
marketing to children as “get[ting] kids to nag their parents and nag them well”). 
 36. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 13.  The first kids’ meal, marketed under the 
name “Happy Meal,” was created in 1977 by a local advertising agency in Kansas City 
and originally consisted of a hamburger, French fries, and a soda in packaging 
resembling circus trains.  See JOHN F. LOVE, MCDONALD’S:  BEHIND THE ARCHES 313 
(1986) (contending that the instant success of Happy Meals foreshadowed their 
lucrative future). 
 37. See Kayla Webley, A Brief History of the Happy Meal, TIME (Apr. 30, 2010), 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1986073,00.html (listing some of 
the most popular toy characters offered in McDonald’s Happy Meals). 
 38. See SCHLOSSER, supra note 35, at 47 (citing a BRANDWEEK article claiming “the 
key to attracting kids is toys, toys, toys”); see also ERIC CLARK, THE REAL TOY STORY:  
INSIDE THE RUTHLESS BATTLE FOR AMERICA’S YOUNGEST CONSUMERS 148–49 (2007) 
(disclosing that Wendy’s quadrupled its spending on the toys in its kids’ meals after 
conducting a study revealing the significant majority of parents who are influenced 
by their children’s food preferences and the influential role toys play in that 
decision). 
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three to nine during the first ten days of the McDonald’s Teenie 
Beanie Baby campaign.39  Moreover, these promotions usually offer 
numerous variations of a toy, thereby encouraging children to make 
repeat visits to obtain the complete set.40 
B. Taking a Different Approach:  The Healthy Food Ordinance 
Recognizing the appeal of kids’ meal toys and believing more 
needed to be done than the fast food industry’s self-regulated efforts 
to curb unhealthy eating among children, Santa Clara County 
enacted a law restricting restaurants from providing toys in kids’ 
meals that were excessively high in total calories, sodium, fat, and 
sugar.41  The ordinance prevents any kids’ meal from providing a toy 
incentive if the meal contains more than 485 calories, 600 milligrams 
of sodium, thirty-five percent of total calories from fat, more than ten 
percent of total calories from saturated fats, and more than ten 
percent of calories from added sugars.42 
Six months later, in November 2010, San Francisco’s Board of 
Supervisors voted to enact a similar ordinance, “regulat[ing] the sales 
practices of restaurants physically packaging or tying a free toy (or 
other incentive item) with unhealthy food for children.”43  San 
Francisco’s Healthy Food Incentives Ordinance,44 which took effect in 
December 2011, requires that all meals offering a toy incentive not 
only include a fruit and vegetable,45 but also contain less than:  600 
                                                          
 39. See CLARK, supra note 38, at 149 (recounting that following the success of toy 
campaigns, such as the McDonald’s Teenie Beanie Baby promotion, some joked that 
fast food restaurants were “now toy stores serving food on the side”); SCHLOSSER, 
supra note 35, at 47 (explaining that during the first ten days of launching its Teenie 
Beanie Baby promotion, McDonald’s sold over 100 million Happy Meals, doubling its 
sales). 
 40. See CLARK, supra note 38, at 149 (disclosing that as part of Burger King’s 
Rugrats promotion, the fast food company offered twelve collectible toys and four 
wristwatches, resulting in double-digit sales increases); SCHLOSSER, supra note 35, at 
47 (revealing that in 1999 McDonald’s offered over eighty different types of Furby 
toys). 
 41. See Sharon Bernstein, San Francisco Bans Happy Meals, L.A. TIMES  
(Nov. 2, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/02/business/la-fi-happy-
meals-20101103 (discussing the impetus behind the Healthy Food Ordinance). 
 42. SANTA CLARA, CAL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § A18-352 (2010). 
 43. S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471.1 to .9 (2011), available at 
http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sfrancisco.shtml (follow “Health Code” 
hyperlink; then follow “Article 8:  Food and Food Products” hyperlink).  The 
Ordinance defines “incentive item” as “any toy, game, trading card, admission ticket 
or other consumer product, whether physical or digital, with particular appeal to 
children and teens but not including . . . any coupon, voucher, ticket, toke, code, or 
password.”  Id. § 471.3. 
 44. The focal point of this piece is San Francisco’s ordinance. 
 45. Specifically, the Healthy Food Ordinance requires that qualifying meals 
contain at least 0.5 cups of fruits and 0.75 cups or more of vegetables, excepting 
meals served at breakfast.  Id. § 471.4. 
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calories, 640 milligrams of sodium, thirty-five percent of total calories 
from fat, and ten percent saturated fat.46  Unlike previous health 
mandates that only placed restrictions on certain types of restaurants, 
the Healthy Meal Ordinance applies to all restaurants, regardless of 
how many other locations they own or whether they provide fast food 
or sit-down service.47 
C. Constitutional Issues Implicated by the Ordinance 
1. Modern dormant Commerce Clause 
The Ordinance warrants review under the dormant Commerce 
Clause because many of the major companies affected by its 
mandates are national corporations, which market products in 
interstate commerce.  To understand the dormant Commerce 
Clause, it is necessary to start with the Commerce Clause, which 
declares that “Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce 
. . . among the several States.”48  Implicit in this doctrine is its negative 
inverse, known as the dormant Commerce Clause, which limits a state 
or municipality’s ability to implement regulations affecting interstate 
commerce49 without Congress’s authority.50  The dormant Commerce 
                                                          
 46. Id.  The Ordinance also outlines standards for single food items, which must 
contain less than thirty-five percent of total calories from fat and less than ten 
percent of calories from added sugars.  Id. 
 47. Compare id. § 471.3 (applying to any retail food establishment), with Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 4205, 124 Stat. 119, 573 
(2010) (regulating only chain restaurants operating twenty or more stores under the 
same name). 
 48. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 182–
83 (1824) (defining commerce as “intercourse” between and among states).  To 
determine whether Congress has the authority to regulate a particular activity, courts 
typically ask whether it has “such a close and substantial relation to interstate 
commerce.”  NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).  Under 
the Commerce Clause, Congress has the authority to regulate both the channels—
such as highways, rivers, railroads, and airways—as well as the instrumentalities—
including trucks, boats, trains, and airplanes—that transport commerce.  United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). 
 49. Modern jurisprudence pertaining to the Commerce Clause reveals divergent 
interpretations of where to draw the line between commercial and non-economic 
activities.  Compare United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (reasoning 
that gender-based violence was not commerce and therefore could not be regulated 
by Congress), and Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557, 561 (narrowing the definition of “interstate 
commerce” and determining that a federal law prohibiting individuals from 
knowingly possessing a gun in a school zone did not substantially affect interstate 
commerce and was therefore unconstitutional), with Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 
25–26 (2005) (holding it constitutional for Congress to regulate commerce among 
the states by prohibiting the cultivation and possession of medicinal marijuana). 
 50. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200, 208 (2d Cir. 
2003) (explaining that “although the [Commerce] Clause is phrased as an 
affirmative grant of congressional power, it is well established that it contains a 
negative or ‘dormant’ aspect” that restricts states from unjustifiably discriminating 
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Clause, therefore, acts as a safeguard against economic protectionism 
by the states.51  
In modern dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the 
Supreme Court has identified three scenarios in which it will 
invalidate a state or municipal law.52  First, if a law is overtly 
discriminatory against out-of-state commerce, it is considered per se 
invalid.53  In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,54 the Court overturned a 
New Jersey statute that explicitly restricted the importation of most 
out-of-state solid waste to reduce the prevalence of landfills in the 
state.55  The Court explained that a law, such as the one at issue, 
which “overtly blocks the flow of interstate commerce at a State’s 
borders,” is subject to a stricter standard of judicial review.56 
Second, if a state or municipal law is facially neutral, it may still 
violate the dormant Commerce Clause if it has a discriminatory effect 
or purpose.57  For example, in Hunt v. Washington State Apple 
Advertising Commission,58 the Court held that North Carolina’s statute 
regarding the labeling of apple containers violated the dormant 
Commerce Clause because it placed an unconstitutional burden on 
the State of Washington, the nation’s largest producer of apples.59  
The statute in question prevented apple producers from using any 
label on their apple containers unless it followed the United States 
                                                          
against or excessively burdening interstate commerce). 
 51. See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521–22 (1935) (asserting that 
states and local regulations may not place an undue burden on interstate 
commerce); Am. Marine Rail NJ, LLC v. City of Bayonne, 289 F. Supp. 2d 569, 578 
(D.N.J. 2003) (citing New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988)) 
(alleging that the dormant Commerce Clause’s purpose is to prevent states from 
favoring in-state commerce at the expense of out-of-state economies). 
 52. Lauren F. Gizzi, Comment, State Menu-Labeling Legislation:  A Dormant Giant 
Waiting to be Awoken by Commerce Clause Challenges, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 501, 506 
(2009). 
 53. Id. at 510. 
 54. 437 U.S. 617 (1978). 
 55. See id. at 625 (believing that this would prevent environmental hazards 
associated with improper waste disposal). 
 56. See id. at 624 (alleging that overt attempts to regulate interstate commerce 
constitute pure “economic protectionism”). 
 57. Gizzi, supra note 52, at 511. 
 58. 432 U.S. 333 (1977). 
 59. See id. at 350–52 (reasoning that the discriminatory nature of the statute 
unlawfully imposed a greater financial burden on Washington apple producers by:  
requiring them to change their labels solely for containers shipped to North 
Carolina; preventing them from advertising their stricter standards for apple quality 
in North Carolina; forcing them to lower their standards to those outlined in the 
USDA; and providing a competitive advantage for North Carolina growers who only 
had to comply with one labeling standard).  A multi-million dollar operation, 
Washington’s commercial production and sale of apples contributed substantially to 
its economy.  Id. at 336.  Washington apple producers shipped 500,000 containers of 
apples to North Carolina each year.  Id. at 337. 
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Department of Agriculture’s grading system.60  This substantially 
burdened states, such as Washington, which used their own industry-
accepted grading system.61 
Third, even if the state or municipal law is not discriminatory on its 
face, in its effect, or in its purpose, it may be deemed 
unconstitutional if its burden on interstate commerce outweighs the 
state’s purported interests.62  Statutes that do not directly discriminate 
against out-of-state commerce are subject to the Pike v. Bruce Church, 
Inc.63 balancing test.64  In Pike, the Supreme Court held that an 
Arizona law preventing local cantaloupe from being packaged out-of-
state violated the dormant Commerce Clause because the state’s 
interest in promoting the reputation of Arizona growers did not 
outweigh the economic burden imposed upon the respondent 
cantaloupe grower.65  The Pike balancing test was again utilized in 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki.66  There, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit deemed the section of New 
York’s Public Health Statute prohibiting cigarette sellers and 
common contract carriers from selling and distributing cigarettes 
directly to New York consumers constitutional under the dormant 
Commerce Clause.67  Applying the Pike balancing test, the court 
determined that the statute’s interference with interstate commerce 
was not excessive in light of the state’s substantial interest in 
protecting the health of its minors by limiting their access to 
cigarettes.68 
                                                          
 60. See id. at 336 (asserting that the state of Washington’s grading system was at 
least equivalent, if not superior, to the standards developed by the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture). 
 61. See id. at 338 (ruling that North Carolina’s grading restrictions would unduly 
burden Washington State apple producers because it would require them to 
abandon their already-established, well-recognized, and highly expensive grading 
system). 
 62. Cf. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472–74 (1981) 
(upholding a state ban on plastic nonreturnable milk containers because its 
principal purpose sought to conserve natural resources and prevent solid waste 
disposal problems, not discriminate between interstate and intrastate commerce). 
 63. 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
 64. See id. at 142 (establishing that such statutes will be upheld as long as their 
subsequent burdens do not outweigh the government interest involved and this 
interest could not be achieved through less burdensome means). 
 65. See id. at 144, 146 (contending that the law may have been upheld had the 
government’s interest been more compelling). 
 66. 320 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 67. Id. at 217. 
 68. See id. (reasoning that the statute’s effects on interstate commerce were de 
minimis and incidental “at most” because it only limited one method for selling 
cigarettes to smokers in New York and did not “obstruct or impede the flow of 
cigarettes into New York State”). 
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2. Commercial speech and the First Amendment 
The Ordinance has also generated concerns that it unlawfully 
infringes on companies’ commercial speech rights.69  Just because a 
product is bought or sold, however, does not automatically qualify the 
related speech as commercial.70  Two important factors in identifying 
commercial speech are the existence of a speaker—typically the 
seller—and an audience—the consumer.71  The Supreme Court has 
consistently identified commercial speech as expression that does “no 
more than propose a commercial transaction,”72 involves the 
economic interest of the seller and consumer,73 and is likely to 
influence the consumer’s commercial decision-making.74 
Traditionally, commercial speech was not considered a guaranteed 
right under the First Amendment75 of the United States 
Constitution.76  Not until Bigelow v. Virginia77 did the Supreme Court 
recognize that the First Amendment’s protection of speech extended 
to paid commercial advertisements.78  Concerned about paternalism, 
the Court reasoned that, while in some cases advertising “may be 
subject to reasonable regulation that serves a legitimate public 
interest[,]” it should not be “stripped of all First Amendment 
protection.”79  The Court reaffirmed this position the following year 
                                                          
 69.  Gordon, supra note 14. 
 70. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943) (holding that 
although donations were sought, selling religious literature did not constitute a 
commercial activity that could be restricted by the government). 
 71. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 256 (Cal. 2002), cert. granted, 537 U.S. 1099 
(2003), dismissed, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (per curiam) (dismissing writ of certiorari as 
improvidently granted). 
 72. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 
376, 385 (1973). 
 73. See Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, 12 P.3d 720, 732 (Cal. 2000) 
(referencing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 
561 (1980)). 
 74. See Kasky, 45 P.3d at 262 (explaining that regardless of the subject of the 
speech under question, it is considered commercial if it will sway the consumer to 
make a desired commercial decision). 
 75. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech . . . .”). 
 76. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (recognizing that the 
Constitution imposes no restraint upon the government with respect to the 
regulation of “purely commercial advertising”); see also Nicki Kennedy, Comment, 
Stop in the Name of Public Policy:  Limiting “Junk Food” Advertisements During Children’s 
Programming, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 503, 507 (2008) (explaining that the 
Supreme Court did not view commercial speech as constitutionally protected until 
1975). 
 77. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).  
 78. See id. at 818 (ruling that there should not be a blanket restriction against 
advertisements receiving First Amendment protection merely because they appear in 
the form of an advertisement). 
 79. Id. at 826. 
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in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 
Inc.,80 ruling that speech merely proposing a commercial transaction 
deserves at least some protection under the First Amendment.81 
Four years later, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public 
Service Commission of New York,82 the Court developed the current test 
to determine whether restrictions on commercial speech are 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.83  Only commercial 
speech that is lawful and not false or misleading is subject to First 
Amendment protection.84  Thus, determining whether the expression 
in question is inherently deceptive or misleading is the first step in 
the four-pronged Central Hudson test.85  Second, a court must assess 
whether the asserted government interest is substantial.86  Third, the 
limitation on commercial speech must directly advance the 
government’s interest.87  And finally, the regulation must be narrowly 
tailored, meaning it must be no more extensive than necessary to 
serve that interest.88   
In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,89 the Supreme Court employed the 
Central Hudson test to overturn state regulations limiting the way 
manufacturers marketed, sold, and distributed cigars and smokeless 
tobacco products in Massachusetts.90  The regulations at issue banned 
                                                          
 80. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 81. Id. at 762 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human 
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). 
 82. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).  
 83. Id. at 566.  The Central Hudson test applies a form of intermediate scrutiny.  
See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, What the Abortion Disclosure Cases Say About the Constitutionality 
of Persuasive Government Speech on Product Labels, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 855, 860 (2010) 
(characterizing the Central Hudson test as falling between strict scrutiny review, which 
courts apply to review restrictions on other forms of speech, and rational basis 
review, which courts reserve for regulations that do not censure speech). 
 84. See Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566 (articulating that this is the threshold 
question of commercial speech analysis). 
 85. See id. (applying step one of the four-part test to determine that the 
expression under question was neither inaccurate nor unlawful). 
 86. See id. at 568–69 (asserting that the government’s two goals in banning an 
electrical utility’s promotional advertising—ensuring energy conservation and fair 
utility—constituted substantial interests, consequently passing the second prong of 
the test).  
 87. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 188 
(1999) (“[A] governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial 
speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will 
in fact alleviate them to a material degree.”). 
 88. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001) (explaining that 
to satisfy the Central Hudson test, the law under question must be a “reasonable fit” 
between the government’s substantial interest and the means with which it seeks to 
achieve that interest).   
 89. 533 U.S. 525, 556 (2001). 
 90. See id. at 565–66 (declaring that Massachusetts’s regulations on the outdoor 
and point-of-sale advertising of tobacco failed the third and fourth steps of the 
Central Hudson test). 
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outdoor advertisements promoting cigars or smokeless tobacco 
within a 1000-foot radius of any school or playground in 
Massachusetts.91  Although the state had a substantial and compelling 
interest in preventing minors’ tobacco usage, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the Massachusetts Attorney General failed to prove 
that these regulations were not more extensive than necessary, as 
required by the fourth prong of Central Hudson test.92  Likewise, the 
Court deemed the restrictions prohibiting stores from displaying 
tobacco advertisements lower than five feet from the floor an 
unconstitutional restriction of commercial speech.93  It reasoned that 
the “blanket height restriction [did] not constitute a reasonable fit” 
with the state’s aim to decrease underage tobacco usage.94 
In one of the Supreme Court’s most recent decisions addressing 
the protection of speech under the First Amendment, Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc.,95 the Court determined that Vermont’s law restricting the 
sale and use of physicians’ prescriber-identifying information 
triggered heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment.96  
Contrary to the majority, Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion argued 
that the statute constituted nothing more than an economic 
regulation and should instead be subject to intermediate scrutiny 
under Central Hudson.97  The Court, however, ultimately adopted a 
very broad definition of speech, characterizing the “creation and 
dissemination of information [as] speech within the meaning of the 
First Amendment.”98 
                                                          
 91. See id. at 561 (finding that the Massachusetts Attorney General 
inappropriately based this blanket regulation on a prior FDA ruling implementing 
the same requirements without adequately considering the diverse impacts these 
restrictions would have on varying geographical landscapes). 
 92. See id. at 565 (pointing out that even though the regulations had the well-
intentioned aim of restricting children’s exposure to tobacco, they would completely 
and unfairly eliminate lawful advertising to adult consumers in some parts of 
Massachusetts). 
 93. Id. at 567. 
 94. See id. at 566–67 (reasoning that the height requirement was arbitrary and 
illogical because not all children are under five-feet tall and even if they were, the 
displays would still be visible to them).  
 95. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011). 
 96. Id. at 2659. 
 97. See id. at 2675 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Vermont’s statute neither forbids nor 
requires anyone to say anything, to engage in any form of symbolic speech, or to 
endorse any particular point of view.”).  Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit has characterized prescriber-identifying information—at issue in 
Sorrell—as “a mere ‘commodity’ with no greater entitlement to First Amendment 
protection than ‘beef jerky.’”  Id. at 2666 (majority opinion) (citing IMS Health Inc. 
v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 52–53 (1st Cir. 2008)). 
 98. Id. at 2667. 
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3. Substantive due process and the Fourteenth Amendment 
Finally, the Ordinance calls into question the permissibility of San 
Francisco’s authority to determine what children should eat99—a role 
traditionally reserved for parents.100  San Francisco’s proposal 
generated much debate among consumers, consumer advocacy and 
health organizations, and the food industry regarding this issue.101  
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
forbids the states from depriving any individual of “life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”102  The Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment is elemental in ensuring that states and 
municipalities do not overstep their bounds when exercising their 
police powers.103   
In determining whether a law violates substantive due process 
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the court first determines 
whether the liberty interest at issue is a fundamental right.104  The 
                                                          
 99. S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471.1 to .9 (2011), available at 
http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sfrancisco.shtml (follow “Health Code” 
hyperlink; then follow “Article 8:  Food and Food Products” hyperlink). 
 100.  See Abramson, supra note 13 (“Feeding our child is an essential part of our 
responsibility as a loving parent [sic].”). 
 101. Part of the challenge in imposing restrictions on fast food in the name of 
combating obesity is that there are numerous “contributing” factors.  See Sharon 
Bernstein, Happy Meal Toys Could Be Banned in Santa Clara County, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 
27, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/27/business/la-fi-happy-meals-
20100427  
(quoting Daniel Conway, spokesman for the California Restaurant Association, who 
claimed that if the government “wants to take away the toys that are making kids fat, 
take away Xboxes, take away PlayStations, take away flat-screen TVs”). 
 102. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  The Due Process Clause covers both 
procedural due process—which protects an individual’s right to fair and impartial 
legal proceedings—and substantive due process—which safeguards an individual’s 
liberties from government interference and is subsequently the focus of this section.  
See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972) (defining procedural due 
process); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (defining substantive 
due process).  For the purposes of this Comment, this section will only touch upon 
the principles of substantive due process that are most relevant to examining the 
tension between parents’ fundamental right to take care of their children and the 
state’s authority to promote the health and well-being of its citizens. 
 103. “Police powers” refer to the authority states delegate to cities and 
municipalities, allowing them to implement regulations that best protect and 
promote the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.  See Berman v. Parker, 348 
U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (providing examples of the traditional police powers such as, 
“[p]ublic safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, [and] law and order”); 
Paul A. Diller & Samantha Graff, Regulating Food Retail for Obesity Prevention:  How Far 
Can Cities Go?, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 89, 89 (Supp. s1 2011) (defining “police power” 
as “the authority to regulate for the health, safety, and welfare of the community”).  
Here, the California Constitution has explicitly delegated such police powers to its 
cities, including San Francisco.  See CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 7 (“A county or city may 
make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances 
and regulations not in conflict with general laws.”).  
 104. See Cruzan v. Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 (1990) (right to refuse 
medical treatment is a fundamental right); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 
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type of asserted interest indicates which level of judicial review the 
court should apply.105  If the interest at issue is not a fundamental 
right, the court applies a more flexible standard, rational basis review, 
which asks whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate 
government purpose.106  Under rational basis review, the party 
challenging the legality of the law holds the burden of proof.107  As 
long as the court believes the government sought to achieve a 
legitimate purpose through reasonable means, it will uphold the 
constitutionality of the law at issue.108   
On the other hand, if the court deems the asserted interest a 
fundamental right, it must apply strict scrutiny to determine whether 
the law in question is necessary to further a compelling government 
interest.109  Under strict scrutiny review, the government has the 
burden of proof to demonstrate that the law at issue was necessary to 
achieve its compelling interest.110  To be considered “necessary,” the 
law must be narrowly tailored—that is, not more burdensome than 
                                                          
(1978) (right to marriage is a fundamental right); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (1965) 
(right to control reproduction is a fundamental right). 
 105. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 503–04 (White, J., concurring) (acknowledging the 
importance of characterizing the nature of the right at issue to determine the proper 
level of judicial review).  
 106. See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955) (“[T]he law need 
not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional.  It is 
enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that 
the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”).  
 107. The challenger must prove that the law does not advance any legitimate 
government interest or is not a reasonable means to attain that interest.  See FCC v. 
Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1993) (explaining that because an 
issue receiving rational basis review holds a “strong presumption of validity,” the 
party challenging its legality has “the burden ‘to negative every conceivable basis that 
might support it’” (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 
364 (1973))). 
 108. In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Supreme Court determined that there was no 
fundamental right to physician-assisted suicide because it was not deeply rooted in 
historical, legal traditions, and, on the contrary, had been universally criminalized 
throughout history.  521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997).   The Court ultimately upheld the 
Washington law prohibiting physician-assisted suicide, finding that it reasonably 
served several legitimate government interests—including preserving human life; 
preventing suicide; protecting “the integrity and ethics of the medical profession;” 
safeguarding vulnerable groups, such as the impoverished, elderly, and terminally ill; 
and avoiding a slippery slope effect that would lead to voluntary, or even involuntary 
euthanasia.  Id. at 728–32. 
 109. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (stating that a compelling 
interest is one “of the highest order” that would legitimize infringing upon a 
fundamental liberty); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 
(1938) (establishing that a stricter level of scrutiny ought to be applied to cases that 
facially appear to violate the Constitution, hinder the political process, or 
discriminate against “discrete and insular minorities”). 
 110. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 341 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(asserting that the government had the burden to prove that detention supported a 
legitimate interest). 
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necessary to achieve the government’s ends; otherwise, it will fail 
strict scrutiny.111   
While due process is essential to protecting the liberty interests of 
citizens from states’ or municipalities’ unlawful exercise of police 
powers, clearly defining what constitutes a protected liberty interest is 
less straightforward.112  The Supreme Court has never explicitly 
asserted what constitutes a “compelling” government interest, but it 
has acknowledged that a state or municipality may interfere with 
citizens’ fundamental rights, if such interference is necessary to 
protect “health, safety, and general welfare.”113  For example, in West 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,114 the Court held that the government’s 
attempt to prevent the unlawful exploitation of female workers was 
compelling for two reasons—such exploitation not only adversely 
affected the workers themselves, but also burdened taxpayers who 
were forced to pay what the workers lost in wages.115  Citing these two 
compelling interests, the Court subsequently upheld the 
constitutionality of the minimum wage law in question.116 
II. THE HEALTHY FOOD ORDINANCE SURVIVES CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGE BECAUSE IT IS NARROWLY TAILORED, ADVANCES 
COMPELLING INTERESTS, AND DOES NOT UNDULY BURDEN INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE 
A. Effect on Interstate Commerce 
Because many of the companies affected by the Healthy Food 
Ordinance are national corporations, the Ordinance invariably 
                                                          
 111. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims 
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991) (finding that while the government had a compelling 
interest to compensate victims of crimes, the statute was not narrowly tailored to 
achieve this end and consequentially unconstitutional). 
 112. Only the first eight amendments of the Constitution enumerate protected 
individual rights.  U.S. CONST. amends. I–VIII.  For asserted interests not included in 
the text of the Constitution, the Supreme Court must rely on precedent to 
determine whether the interest is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” Palko 
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937); “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition,” Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality 
opinion); or essential to “define one’s own concept of existence,” Planned 
Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality 
opinion). 
 113. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220 (determining that the compulsory education law did 
not constitute a compelling interest because it was not necessary to protect the 
health and welfare of children).  
 114. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 115. Id. at 399. 
 116. See id. at 400 (affirming the Supreme Court of Washington’s judgment to 
validate a state law aimed at protecting women and minors from unjust working 
conditions). 
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affects interstate commerce and therefore warrants review under the 
dormant Commerce Clause.  For a local law to withstand a challenge 
under the dormant Commerce Clause, the state or municipality—in 
this case San Francisco—must have a substantial local interest that 
does not impose excessive burdens on interstate commerce.117 
On its face, the Healthy Food Ordinance does not discriminate 
against out-of-state interests, nor is it motivated by simple economic 
protectionism, as was the case of the government actions at issue in 
City of Philadelphia and Hunt.118  Unlike the New Jersey statute at issue 
in City of Philadelphia, which drew territorial distinctions that 
unlawfully excluded the importation of solid or liquid waste from 
other states,119 the Healthy Food Ordinance does not prevent certain 
restaurants from providing toys in kids’ meals because they are out-of-
state companies.120  Instead, it focuses on the nutritional quality of the 
meal itself, regardless of whether the restaurant is a local business or 
nationwide chain.121  Nor does the Healthy Food Ordinance have a 
discriminatory purpose or effect like the North Carolina statute that 
was struck down in Hunt.122  Its stated intent is “to improve the health 
of children and adolescents in San Francisco by setting healthy 
nutritional standards for children’s meals sold at restaurants in 
                                                          
 117. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 474 (1981) 
(holding that a law interfering with interstate commerce is constitutional unless its 
burden on interstate commerce significantly outweighs a state’s legitimate interests); 
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 146 (1970) (overturning an Arizona law 
imposing strict requirements on the production and packaging of fruits and 
vegetables shipped to other states because the burdens outweighed the state’s de 
minimis interest to promote its growers’ reputations). 
 118. See City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (finding a New Jersey 
law facially discriminatory and therefore in violation of the dormant Commerce 
Clause); Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 352–53 (1977) 
(overruling a North Carolina law because of its discriminatory effect). 
 119. City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 618.  
 120. Similar to the statute at issue in Clover Leaf Creamery, the Healthy Food 
Ordinance ensures a legitimate state interest—protecting children’s health—as 
opposed to promoting “simple economic protectionism,” as was the case in City of 
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624. 
 121. The Healthy Food Ordinance is similar to the Maryland statute preventing 
petroleum producers or refiners from operating retail service stations in Maryland in 
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 120–21 (1978).  There, the Court 
pointed out that “Maryland’s entire gasoline supply flows in interstate commerce and 
since there are no local producers or refiners, such claims of disparate treatment 
between interstate and local commerce would be meritless.”  Id. at 125.   
 122. Compare S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471.1 to 471.9 (2011), available at 
http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sfrancisco.shtml (follow “Health Code” 
hyperlink; then follow “Article 8:  Food and Food Products” hyperlink) (explaining 
that promoting healthier menu options at fast food restaurants is the impetus behind 
the Healthy Food Ordinance), with Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352–53 (ruling that a North 
Carolina law was unconstitutional because of its discriminatory effect), and Kassel v. 
Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 676–78 (1981) (plurality opinion) 
(deeming an Iowa statute unlawful because it had a discriminatory purpose). 
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combination with free toys or other incentive items.”123  Additionally, 
the law does not place this burden solely on large chain restaurants, 
but instead broadly defines “restaurant” as any “establishment that . . . 
prepares food for human consumption at the retail level.”124  
Therefore, a restriction prohibiting restaurants from providing toys 
in kids’ meals that fail to meet the established nutritional 
requirements burdens both local and out-of-state businesses.125 
Based on modern dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the 
Healthy Food Ordinance would likely pass constitutional muster 
under the Pike balancing test because the Ordinance advances a 
legitimate state interest that outweighs any potential burdens on 
interstate commerce.126  Unlike the statute at issue in Pike, which was 
solely driven by the state’s economic interests,127 the Healthy Food 
Ordinance is a public health issue, an area “where the propriety of 
local regulation has long been recognized.”128  The Healthy Food 
Ordinance more closely resembles the New York law regulating the 
shipment and sale of cigarettes that was upheld in Pataki.129  Not only 
do the Healthy Food Ordinance and the New York statute in Pataki 
share the same governmental interest—safeguarding the health of 
minors by limiting their exposure to products deemed to adversely 
affect their health—but this concern outweighs the de minimis 
effects both statutes have on interstate economies.130 
                                                          
 123. HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471.2.  
 124. Id. § 471.3. 
 125. In upholding the Minnesota statute at issue in Clover Leaf Creamery, the Court 
noted that a law’s detrimental impacts on its own, in-state economic interests usually 
indicate an absence of economic protectionism.  449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1981). 
 126. See Exxon, 437 U.S. at 126 (clarifying that a state regulation’s impact on 
interstate commerce does not, in and of itself, constitute a violation of the dormant 
Commerce Clause).  Central to assessing whether a state or municipality has the 
power to regulate interstate commerce is the question of whether the state or 
municipality’s interest is deemed sufficient to justify this commercial interference.  
Id.  As articulated by the Court in Clover Leaf Creamery:  “[o]nly if the burden on 
interstate commerce clearly outweighs the State’s legitimate purposes does such a 
regulation violate the Commerce Clause.”  449 U.S. at 474. 
 127. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 143 (1970) (explaining that the 
Arizona act was passed to prevent tarnishing the reputation and returns of Arizona 
growers). 
 128. See id. (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 796 (1945) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting)).  
 129. Compare S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471.4 (2011), available at 
http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sfrancisco.shtml (follow “Health Code” 
hyperlink; then follow “Article 8:  Food and Food Products” hyperlink) (regulating 
incentives at all restaurants in the county), with Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. 
v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200, 216, 219 (2d Cir. 2003) (reasoning that preventing direct 
shipment of cigarettes to the consumer places was a “de minimis burden on 
interstate commerce” because it “applies evenhandedly to both in-state and out-of-
state businesses and does not impede the flow of goods in interstate commerce”). 
 130. In Pataki, both parties agreed that a state has a legitimate interest in 
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Recent initiatives by fast food purveyors to improve the nutritional 
quality of kids’ meals tip the Pike balancing scale in favor of the 
Healthy Food Ordinance.131  Restaurants affected by the Ordinance 
could still argue that it imposes an undue burden because they would 
have to change their business operations and marketing campaign 
only in the counties that have enacted the Healthy Food 
Ordinance.132  This contention is severely weakened by fast food 
restaurants’ recent attempts to offer and promote more wholesome 
kids’ meals.133  In light of these already-proposed improvements, fast 
food purveyors would avoid the burdensome task of having to 
reinvent their menus as a result of the new regulations.134  Moreover, 
some of these restaurants already offer several existing combinations 
that satisfy all but the Healthy Food Ordinance’s vegetable 
requirement.135 
                                                          
protecting the health of its citizens by restricting minors’ access to cigarettes and, 
more generally, decreasing cigarette consumption.  See 320 F.3d at 217 (declaring 
that the New York statute at issue effectively promotes this interest and only has 
incidental effects on interstate commerce).  
 131. See Happy Meal Gets a Makeover, THE CHART (July 26, 2011, 1:35 PM), 
http://thechart.blogs.cnn.com/ (reporting that “[t]he new Happy Meal with four 
pieces of McNuggets, apple slices, smaller French Fries and 1% milk has 410 calories, 
19 grams of fat and 560 milligrams of sodium”); see also infra Part III.A (detailing 
some of the industry’s menu changes following the passage of the Ordinance). 
 132. Not only would companies have to make concessions for the counties that 
have enacted similar bans, but they would have to make further adjustments 
depending on the nutritional standards established by the state or municipality.  For 
example, the bill proposed by Councilman Leroy Comrie in New York City sets 
stricter standards than those required in San Francisco.  Each meal would have to 
contain less than 500 calories and 600 milligrams of sodium, as opposed to San 
Francisco’s 600 calorie and 640 milligrams of sodium maximums.  Compare Meredith 
Melnick, New York City Council Considers Banning Happy Meal Toys, TIME  
(Apr. 6, 2011), http://healthland.time.com/2011/04/06/new-york-city-council-
considers-banning-happy-meal-toys/ (summarizing New York City’s proposed 
standards), with S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471.4 (2011),  
available at http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sfrancisco.shtml (follow “Health 
Code” hyperlink; then follow “Article 8:  Food and Food Products” hyperlink) 
(outlining San Francisco’s nutritional requirements).  
 133. Presumably, companies like McDonald’s and Burger King have already 
changed their marketing campaign, advertising only their healthier items to 
children.  See PEELER, supra note 28, at 19 (outlining the pledge to only advertise 
healthier offerings that fast food companies like McDonald’s and Burger King have 
volunteered to follow). 
 134. See infra Part III.A (noting several fast food companies’ attempts to improve 
the nutritional quality of their kids’ meals).  In July 2011, McDonald’s announced its 
short-term and long-term goals to continue making Happy Meals healthier for 
children by significantly reducing sodium, added sugars, saturated fats, and calories.  
Happy Meal Gets a Makeover, supra note 131.  Moreover, these changes are purportedly 
voluntary, as opposed to being instigated by the Healthy Food Ordinance.  See 
Rexrode, supra note 32 (quoting Cindy Goody, the senior director of nutrition for 
McDonald’s, who denied that the Happy Meal changes resulted from recent 
regulations like the Healthy Food Ordinance). 
 135. With the addition of a vegetable, the new McDonald’s Happy Meal 
containing four pieces of chicken McNuggets, apples slices, French fries, and one-
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Opponents might also challenge the Ordinance’s legality under 
the dormant Commerce Clause by portraying the link between the 
consumption of kids’ meals and childhood obesity as tenuous at 
best.136  Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, however, suggests 
that if the law affecting interstate commerce is an attempt to protect 
public health or safety, it will likely be upheld because states have 
traditionally assumed the duty of ensuring the well-being of their 
citizens.137  Courts are more lenient toward laws protecting the health 
and safety of citizens even if their effects are slight and the means of 
achieving those results are not wholly direct.138 
B. Restraint on Commercial Speech 
While the Healthy Food Ordinance does not unlawfully impinge 
on the dormant Commerce Clause, it is susceptible to First 
Amendment challenges.  However, unlike prior attempts to regulate 
child-targeted marketing, the Ordinance does not run afoul of the 
commercial speech doctrine because the Ordinance is narrowly 
tailored and directly advances a substantial government interest. 
1. Regulating what restaurants sell, not what they say 
Similar to companies who use cartoon characters in their 
advertisements to directly appeal to children,139 some fast food 
companies provide free toy giveaways in kids’ meals as a marketing 
tool to entice children to buy their products.140  While both 
advertisements and premiums targeted at children share the same 
                                                          
percent milk would be able to contain a toy under the Ordinance’s health 
requirements.  Happy Meal Gets a Makeover, supra note 131. 
 136. See Hill, supra note 4, at 108–09 (“[F]ew studies have been conducted to 
identify the specific factors in the current environment that facilitate obesity.”).  
 137. See Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 687 (1981) (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion for “intrud[ing] upon the 
fundamental right of the States to pass laws to secure the safety of their citizens”); 
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 28–29 (1905) (granting greater judicial 
deference to state regulation pertaining to public health concerns); see also Gizzi, 
supra note 52, at 509 (asserting that issues concerning the public well-being are 
“quintessential” subjects of state or local, as opposed to federal, regulation). 
 138. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200, 217 (2d Cir. 
2003) (maintaining that even if the regulations only slightly decrease the sale of 
cigarettes to minors, the underlying government interest was foremost to the 
regulations being upheld). 
 139. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 558 (2001) (noting the 
significant increase in tobacco products purchased by youths following the 
introduction of Joe Camel). 
 140. Roy Bergold, the former head of advertising at McDonald’s, stated that 
“companies have found that kids are a lot more tempted by the toys than the food.”  
Roy T. Bergold, Jr., The Obesity Debate, QSR MAGAZINE (Nov. 2010), 
http://www.qsrmagazine.com/roy-bergold/obesity-debate. 
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goals—appealing to children to establish brand loyalty and increase 
consumption—the Healthy Food Ordinance is meaningfully different 
from prior attempts to restrict child-targeted marketing because the 
Ordinance regulates companies’ business conduct, as opposed to 
their speech.141  Unlike toy incentives offered in kids’ meals, the 
Court deemed the information at issue in Sorrell “speech” because it 
was “essential to advance human knowledge and to conduct human 
affairs.”142  Here, the language of the Ordinance specifically states:  
“[t]he City does not seek to limit or regulate any speech, 
communication or advertising on the part of any restaurant in any 
manner.  Nor does the City seek to ban entirely the practice of tying 
free toys with children’s meals.”143  The distinction is important 
because of the constitutional issues raised by opponents of the FTC’s 
efforts to restrict junk food advertisements aimed at children.144  At 
most, the Healthy Food Ordinance would have an indirect impact on 
commercial speech because companies would have to change their 
advertising schemes.145  As the Supreme Court noted in Sorrell, the 
First Amendment does not preclude regulations governing conduct 
or commerce that merely inflict incidental burdens on speech.146 
2. Marketing partnerships 
While the foregoing reasons demonstrate why restaurants 
providing toys in kids’ meals would not have a valid claim against the 
Healthy Food Ordinance on commercial speech grounds, companies 
that form marketing contracts with these restaurants to promote their 
movie, television show, or apparel may have a viable claim.147  For 
                                                          
 141. See Diller & Graff, supra note 103, at 92 tbl.2 (categorizing Santa Clara’s 
Healthy Food Ordinance as an attempt to regulate business operations).   
 142. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011). 
 143. S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471.1 (2011), available at 
http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sfrancisco.shtml (follow “Health Code” 
hyperlink; then follow “Article 8:  Food and Food Products” hyperlink). 
 144. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the constitutional hurdles that thwarted earlier 
government attempts to restrict child-targeted marketing). 
 145. The Supreme Court has traditionally viewed advertisements as commercial 
speech.  See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) 
(permitting First Amendment protection for advertisements containing liquor 
prices); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 
748 (1976) (employing First Amendment protection for advertisements listing 
prescription drug prices).  
 146. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2664–65 (citing Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & 
Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006)); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 
505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 
(1949).  
 147. See CLARK, supra note 38, at 148 (detailing the history of the Happy Meal toy 
from offering a McDonald’s character figurine in its primary years to today’s practice 
of offering toys tied with major motion pictures).  In August 2011, McDonald’s 
launched a three-week campaign in partnership with Skechers, offering toy versions 
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example, capitalizing on the marketing potential of fifty-eight million 
customers who frequent McDonald’s on a daily basis, Twentieth 
Century Fox (Fox) formed a partnership with McDonald’s in 2009 to 
promote five of its upcoming blockbuster releases.148  For movie 
studios like Fox, the packaging of, and the toy incentives in, Happy 
Meals are the ideal way to advertise their recent or upcoming film 
releases to millions of prospective movie viewers, some of whom the 
studio may not have reached with other forms of advertising.149  Even 
though this commercial expression comes in the form of a toy, the 
Supreme Court has made clear that the First Amendment protects 
more than mere spoken or written words.150  The Court’s liberal 
interpretation of “speech” supports the contention that the Healthy 
Food Ordinance infringes upon movie studios’ protected speech.151  
Therefore, this Comment next analyzes the constitutionality of the 
Healthy Food Ordinance under the assumption that it does regulate 
speech.152  
3. Surviving Central Hudson  
If the Healthy Food Ordinance constitutes a restriction of 
commercial speech, it would be subject to intermediate scrutiny 
under Central Hudson.153  Comparisons with Lorillard and the FTC’s 
failed attempt to restrict child-targeted advertising provide an 
insightful lens through which to analyze the legality of the Healthy 
                                                          
of Twinkle Toes, Skechers Kids’ sneakers for girls.  Karlene Lukovitz, McD’s Latest 
Happy Meal Toys:  Mini Skechers, MEDIAPOST NEWS (Aug. 25, 2011, 12:31 PM), 
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?fa=Articles.showArticle&art_aid=157436.   
 148. McDonald’s has also formed partnerships with other major film studios, such 
as Disney and DreamWorks Animation SKG Inc.  See Claudia Eller, Twentieth Century 
Fox Orders Up Movie Pact with McDonald’s, L.A. TIMES (May 14, 2009), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/14/business/fi-ct-mcfox14 (reporting that 
Disney ended its ten-year partnership with McDonald’s because the studio wanted to 
separate itself from fast food after launching a healthy-eating campaign).  
 149. See id. (revealing that the use of Happy Meal toys and packaging to promote 
recent releases is a popular marketing tool for movie studios that are trying to cut 
back on their advertising costs). 
 150. In depicting the versatility and comprehensiveness of the First Amendment, 
the Supreme Court asserted that symbolism in the form of the “unquestionably 
shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg, or Jabberwocky 
verse of Lewis Carroll” still constitutes speech.  Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian 
& Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1985). 
 151. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667 (declaring prescriber-identifying information for 
pharmaceutical marketing purposes a form speech).  
 152. See infra Part II.A.3 (applying the Central Hudson test to analyze whether the 
Healthy Food Ordinance would survive commercial speech challenges).  
 153. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 555 (2001) (following the 
precedent of Central Hudson to assess the constitutionality of regulations limiting 
commercial speech).   
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Food Ordinance under the commercial speech doctrine.154 
A court would likely uphold the Ordinance under Central Hudson 
because a municipality has a substantial interest in safeguarding 
children’s health, which the Ordinance directly advances, and the 
regulation is no more extensive than necessary to achieve this 
interest.  As long as the toy promotion is not false, misleading, or 
unlawful, it would at least survive the first prong of Central Hudson.155  
The Healthy Food Ordinance would pass the second prong of the 
Central Hudson test under the same rationale adopted in Lorillard—
the Court relied on policy-based reasoning to conclude that states 
had a legitimate concern to regulate minors’ consumption of tobacco 
products when tobacco use at the time was the most pressing health 
issue in the United States.156  In Lorillard, the Court explained that 
children lack the cognitive abilities to recognize the persuasive ploys 
of advertising.157  As previously discussed, food purveyors similarly 
recognize the vulnerability of children as marketing subjects and 
utilize techniques that directly target child consumers.158  Contrary to 
the food industry’s claim that its marketing practices only influence 
children’s brand preferences, the World Health Organization 
                                                          
 154. Like the regulations at issue in Lorillard, the Healthy Food Ordinance 
represents the government’s attempt to protect children from marketing that could 
adversely impact their health.  See S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471.2 (2011), 
available at http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sfrancisco.shtml (follow “Health 
Code” hyperlink; then follow “Article 8:  Food and Food Products” hyperlink) 
(stating the Ordinance’s purpose to promote healthier eating habits among 
children, particularly when they eat out at restaurants); see also Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 
533 (citing the goals of the restrictions on tobacco advertisements as trying to 
decrease the high number of adolescent smokers).  
 155. In 1992, McDonald’s Happy Meal promotion of Batman Returns generated 
public outrage among parents who blamed the fast food corporation for prompting 
young children to see such a graphically violent movie.  See Anne Thompson & Pat 
H. Broeske, Hawking ‘Batman,’ ENT. WKLY. (July 10, 1992), 
http://www.ew.com/ew/article/0,,311012,00.html (conveying concerns that 
McDonald’s falsely promoted Batman Returns as an appropriate film for children).  
This would likely be the type of false or misleading “speech” that would not warrant 
First Amendment protection.  
 156. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 570; see supra Introduction (characterizing childhood 
obesity as a major health concern).   
 157. See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 558 (referencing the Surgeon General’s report and 
the Institute of Medicine’s findings supporting the significant influence tobacco 
advertisements had on young people’s decision to smoke cigarettes).  Unlike the 
physicians who were the targeted audience in Sorrell, and whom the Supreme Court 
deemed were “sophisticated and experienced consumers,” the government here has 
a greater obligation to protect children from influential marketing.  See Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2671 (2011) (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 775 
(1993)). 
 158. See Hill, supra note 4, at 109 (holding marketing tactics aimed at promoting 
junk food directly to children partly responsible for the prevalence of childhood 
obesity); see also supra Part I.A.1 (illustrating the powerful effect kids’ meal toys have 
in attracting child consumers). 
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concluded that the commercial advancement of high-calorie, low-
nutrient products adversely affects children’s health.159 
While the regulations in Lorillard failed the third prong of the 
Court’s Central Hudson analysis, the Healthy Food Ordinance would 
likely survive this prong because its nutritional standards directly 
advance the government’s interest in promoting children’s health.160  
Kids’ meal toys were specifically designed to incite children to 
relentlessly pester their parents to buy them fast food.161  In 
behavioral psychology, rewarding an individual for a purchase 
decision is a form of operant conditioning, which becomes 
problematic when the reward reinforces bad or unhealthy behavior.162  
Unlike in Lorillard, where the Court disallowed Massachusetts’s point-
of-purchase restrictions because they failed to reasonably relate to the 
government’s aims to dissuade minors from smoking tobacco, the 
Healthy Food Ordinance directly advances the government’s interest 
in encouraging healthier eating habits among children.163  The 
Ordinance’s nutritional standards are not based on some arbitrary 
figure but instead parallel what has scientifically been found to be the 
acceptable maximums for children.164  Therefore, restrictions on toys 
in kids’ meals that exceed 600 calories or 650 milligrams of sodium 
do not constitute unreasonable, blanket requirements, as was the case 
with the outdoor ban and point-of-purchase restrictions in Lorillard.165  
On the contrary, these restrictions were thoughtfully and rationally 
designed to promote healthier food options for children.166  
Finally, the Healthy Food Ordinance satisfies the fourth prong of 
                                                          
 159. WORLD HEALTH ORG., MARKETING OF FOOD AND NON-ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES TO 
CHILDREN 1 (2006), available at http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity/ 
publications/Oslo%20meeting%20layout%2027%20NOVEMBER.pdf; see supra 
Introduction (articulating the significant impacts marketing has on children). 
 160. See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 566–67 (noting that the blanket height restrictions 
on the point-of-purchase display of tobacco products do not directly advance the 
State’s goal in limiting children’s access to such products because not all youths are 
under five-feet tall, and even if they were, they could still look up and see the packets 
of cigars and smokeless tobacco).  
 161. See SCHLOSSER, supra note 35, at 43 (discussing the notion of pester power).  
 162. See Joanna Hull, Playing with Children’s Minds:  The Psychological Effects of 
Tobacco Advertisements on Children, 1 YORK SCHOLAR 1, 3 (2004) (citing Camel 
cigarette’s “Camel Cash” promotion as a form of operant condition—enticing youths 
to buy cigarettes to be rewarded with free sunglasses and other giveaways).  
 163. Cf. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 567 (holding that the blanket height restriction does 
not reasonably further the State’s aim to decrease underage tobacco usage). 
 164. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 3, at 47.  
 165. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 534. 
 166. Cf. id. at 566–67 (overturning Massachusetts’s ban on outdoor tobacco 
advertisements because the Attorney General unreasonably imposed requirements 
that did not take into consideration the specific and differing impacts they would 
have on the public depending on where individuals lived). 
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Central Hudson because it is not more extensive than necessary to 
serve San Francisco’s interest.  The advertisements at issue in Lorillard 
and in the FTC’s advertising ban were deemed unconstitutional 
because they unlawfully limited adults’ access to advertisements.167  
Even though in both cases the restrictions were aimed at protecting 
children’s health and limiting their exposure to harmful products, 
they were not narrowly tailored to satisfy the fourth prong of the 
Central Hudson test.168  Here, the Healthy Food Ordinance likely 
avoids these same constitutional pitfalls.  The Healthy Food 
Ordinance does not have broad, sweeping effects that also adversely 
impact adult consumers.169  Therefore, this case is distinguishable 
from Lorillard and prior attempts to restrict child-directed marketing 
because taking away toys in certain kids’ meals would only impact 
children.170 
Moreover, San Francisco has already implemented less intrusive 
efforts aimed at childhood obesity, and these efforts further 
distinguish the Ordinance from earlier attempts to restrict marketing 
to children.  In describing the purpose of the Ordinance, San 
Francisco outlined the numerous community programs it already 
offers—encouraging children to walk or ride their bicycles to school, 
discouraging soda consumption, and increasing families’ access to 
wholesome foods—which address some of the contributing factors of 
childhood obesity.171  Additionally, because it only imposes limited 
restrictions—as opposed to outright bans, which was the case with 
earlier efforts aimed at childhood obesity—the Ordinance provides 
an incentive for restaurants to make the changes necessary to provide 
and promote more wholesome meals to children.172  These other 
measures demonstrate why the Healthy Food Ordinance is necessary 
and not excessive in addressing this multi-faceted issue.  
C. Interference with Substantive Due Process  
Even though the Ordinance survives dormant Commerce Clause 
                                                          
 167. Id. at 561–63. 
 168. Id. at 561. 
 169. See SCHLOSSER, supra note 35, at 47 (explaining that Happy Meal toys 
advertisements are aimed at children aged three to nine). 
 170. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 581. 
 171. See S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471.1 (2011), available at 
http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sfrancisco.shtml (follow “Health Code” 
hyperlink; then follow “Article 8:  Food and Food Products” hyperlink) (listing the 
various other initiatives in San Francisco designed to improve children’s health).  
 172. Cf. Pecquet, supra note 24 (quoting Professor Howard Beales, who pointed 
out that outright bans on products disincentivize companies from making 
improvements).  
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analysis and reconciles First Amendment issues that hampered 
previous childhood obesity regulations, it raises concerns of 
paternalism.  Prior to the passage of the Healthy Food Ordinance, 
the restaurant industry lobbied hard to thwart its approval, basing its 
arguments on constitutional grounds.173  The passage of the 
Ordinance garnered public criticism from consumers who fear the 
ban signifies “a paternalistic slippery slope.”174  It even captured the 
attention of The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, which satirized the future 
of the “Crappy Meal”—devoid of its fun and colorful packaging and 
instead equipped with the Periodic Table of Elements, CPR 
instructions, and a toy figurine of Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.175   
Because of the Ordinance’s paternalistic implications, substantive 
due process is the most logical doctrinal tool for assessing its 
constitutionality.176  Although not explicitly stated in the Constitution, 
the Supreme Court has traditionally recognized parents’ right to raise 
their children without government interference as a fundamental 
interest.177  From a practical standpoint, however, it would be 
ridiculous to imagine that anyone would challenge the Ordinance on 
these grounds, let alone that a court would find the Ordinance 
deserves strict scrutiny review.  Nevertheless, the Healthy Food 
Ordinance lays the groundwork for states and municipalities to 
                                                          
 173. See Gordon, supra note 14 (relaying California Restaurant Association 
spokesman Daniel Conway’s concerns that the Ordinance may violate First 
Amendment liberties). 
 174. In 2008, Mississippi Representative John Read proposed statewide legislation 
that would prohibit restaurants from serving obese customers.  Nanci Hellmich, 
Restaurants as Obesity Cops Doesn’t Sit Well, USA TODAY (Feb. 5, 2008, 11:07 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/2008-02-05-obesity-restaurant-law_n.htm.  
Although Representative Read admitted the bill was merely aimed to raise public 
awareness of the issue, and not actually be enacted, such a proposal reveals the type 
of legal interventions that might follow the Healthy Food Ordinance.  Id.  But see 
Bernstein, supra note 101 (noting that some consumers believe their municipalities 
should enact similar bans that prohibit play areas at fast food restaurants). 
 175. The Daily Show, supra note 12.  
 176. See Travis Ramon, San Francisco to Take Away Parents’ Rights:   Ban on Happy 
Meals Coming, YAHOO! VOICES (Nov. 9, 2010), http://www.associatedcontent.com/ 
article/5990420/san_francisco_to_take_away_parents_pg2.html?cat=5 (contending 
that the Healthy Food Ordinance’s limitations on the options parents have when 
ordering kids’ meals for their children is overly intrusive and an abuse of the 
government’s police powers). 
 177. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (identifying parents’ care over 
their children as “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized 
by [the Supreme] Court”); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (categorizing a 
parent’s authority over one’s children as a fundamental right); Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“[T]he custody, care and nurture of the 
child reside first in the parents.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) 
(asserting the right to protect family autonomy by controlling the upbringing of 
one’s children).  
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extend their authority from the public to private realms.  
Theoretically, if San Francisco can determine what meals are too 
unhealthy in restaurants, what is stopping local municipalities from 
setting limits on how many calories or how much sodium parents may 
feed their children at home?  Therefore, assessing whether 
municipalities, like San Francisco, have a compelling interest in 
restricting what parents feed their children warrants careful 
consideration.  
1. Using Lorillard and West Coast Hotel to frame San Francisco’s 
 compelling interests 
The Supreme Court has traditionally held that state or municipal 
laws that are enacted to ensure the health, safety, and general welfare 
of its people do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.178  These 
laws, however, were primarily aimed at communicable diseases that 
posed a threat to the entire population.179  Setting aside the debate of 
whether obesity constitutes a “public health” issue, the Ordinance still 
advances two compelling interests—the first of which is protecting 
the health and well-being of children by making unhealthy food less 
enticing.180  
Although a court has never had the opportunity to formally 
determine that preventing childhood obesity constitutes a 
“compelling” government interest, a comparison can be made with 
the Supreme Court’s view toward minors’ usage of tobacco products.  
In his concurring opinion in Lorillard, Justice Thomas highlighted the 
parallels between the high mortality rates resulting from tobacco use 
and obesity.181  He acknowledged that even though fast food has not 
been found to be addictive in the same way that science has found 
tobacco to be, fast food marketing that targets child consumers can 
                                                          
 178. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (“[A] state is not without 
constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their 
physical or mental health is jeopardized.”); Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (noting that the 
private sphere of family life is not immune from government regulation in the 
furtherance of the public interest); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) 
(overturning a parent’s challenges to the constitutionality of a regulation because 
the government had a legitimate interest in protecting public safety); Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 146 (1878) (same). 
 179. See, e.g., Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 39 (upholding Massachusetts’s compulsory 
vaccination law). 
 180. See S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471.1 (2011), available at 
http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sfrancisco.shtml (follow “Health Code” 
hyperlink; then follow “Article 8:  Food and Food Products” hyperlink) (articulating 
the Healthy Food Ordinance’s goal to “increase the likelihood that parents will make 
healthier choices for their children when eating out”).   
 181. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 588 (2001) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
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have equally “deleterious consequences that are difficult to 
reverse.”182  Just as the Supreme Court in Lorillard characterized 
Massachusetts’s interest in restricting minors’ tobacco usage as 
“substantial, and even compelling,” so too would a court find that the 
Healthy Food Ordinance advances a compelling interest.183  
According to the Institute of Medicine’s June 2011 report on 
childhood obesity, “slightly more than twenty percent of children 
between the ages of two and five are already overweight or obese.”184  
Proponents of the Ordinance point out that the restrictions level the 
playing field between persuasive junk food marketers and parents 
who struggle to get their children to eat more wholesome foods.185  In 
light of continually increasing rates of obesity and other diet-related 
illnesses among children and the influential role fast food marketers 
play in children’s food preferences, the government’s involvement in 
promoting healthier food choices is both pressing and necessary.186   
The second compelling interest pertains to the Ordinance’s 
attempt to quell rising healthcare expenses related to diet-related 
illnesses that impose economic burdens on taxpayers.187  As the 
Supreme Court established in its West Coast Hotel decision, the 
government has a compelling interest in regulating matters that have 
economically adverse impacts on its citizens.188  Childhood obesity is a 
substantial concern for states and municipalities because its 
economic costs continue into adulthood.189  With $168 billion being 
                                                          
 182. Id. at 587; see also supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the persuasive impact toy 
incentives have on children and their food choices). 
 183. See Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 562 (explaining that despite it being a compelling 
interest, the regulations at issue did not narrowly target minors, but affected adults as 
well, for whom smoking tobacco is a lawful activity).  
 184. INST. OF MED., EARLY CHILDHOOD OBESITY PREVENTION POLICIES 1 (2011), 
available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=13124&page=1. 
 185. See Bernstein, supra note 101 (maintaining that it took years for one 
consumer to get her daughter to eat healthy food after going through a period of 
frequenting McDonald’s just to get the Happy Meal toy).  
 186. See supra Part I (detailing the current food environment and why new 
regulations, like the Healthy Food Ordinance, may be needed). 
 187. See Nancy Hellmich, Rising Obesity Will Cost U.S. Health Care $344 Billion a Year, 
USA TODAY (Nov. 17, 2009 10:17 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/ 
weightloss/2009-11-17-future-obesity-costs_N.htm (estimating obesity-related health-
care costs to reach $344 billion by 2018). 
 188. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937) (allowing the State 
of Washington to enact a law regulating minimum wage on the grounds that it 
advanced a compelling state interest by not only preventing the unlawful 
exploitation of workers but also protecting taxpayers from  bearing the burden of 
paying the workers’ lost wages).  But see Jacob Sullum, The War on Fat:  Is the Size of 
Your Butt the Government’s Business?, REASON (Aug./Sept. 2004), available at 
http://reason.com/archives/2004/08/01/the-war-on-fat/singlepage (contending 
that the logic of this argument could be extended to allow the government’s 
involvement in such mundane and personal issues as “whether you floss regularly”).  
 189. See S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471.1 (2011), available at 
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spent annually on obesity—over sixteen percent of the nation’s 
healthcare expenses—the direct and indirect effects of obesity are 
financially burdensome and all-encompassing.190  A recent White 
House press release emphasized the widespread impact of childhood 
obesity, stating that this “is not just a health or family issue alone.  It is 
an economic issue that impacts workforces, job growth, and local 
budgets across the country.”191 
2. The Ordinance’s narrow-tailoring 
In addition to advancing compelling government interests, the 
Healthy Food Ordinance is narrowly tailored and would survive strict 
scrutiny.192  The Ordinance specifically provides that it does not aim 
to regulate fast food companies’ advertising nor ban the practice of 
providing toys with kids’ meals altogether.193  Therefore, parents may 
still purchase meals that contain toys so long as the kids’ meal satisfies 
the Ordinance’s nutritional requirements; and yet, parents still have 
the option to purchase meals that do not satisfy those nutritional 
limits.194  Consequently, the Healthy Food Ordinance is not overly 
burdensome and is arguably the least restrictive way to help parents 
select the most wholesome option for their children when eating 
out.195  Because the Healthy Food Ordinance would likely survive 
strict scrutiny, it would also pass rational basis review, and 
                                                          
http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sfrancisco.shtml (follow “Health Code” 
hyperlink; then follow “Article 8:  Food and Food Products” hyperlink) (“As children 
and adolescents in San Francisco become adults, their high rates of obesity and 
overweight are likely to contribute to the already high economic costs of healthcare 
and loss of productivity associated with adult obesity in San Francisco.”); see also Carla 
Fried, McDonald’s Hit by Happy Meal Toy Ban, CBS NEWS:  MONEY WATCH (Nov. 4, 
2010, 11:50 AM), http://moneywatch.bnet.com/economic-news/blog/daily-
money/mcdonalds-hit-by-happy-meal-toy-ban/1510/ (attributing increased health 
insurance costs and Medicare expenses to the rising rates of obesity and other diet-
related illnesses). 
 190. See Fried, supra note 189 (citing a recent study conducted by Cornell 
regarding the economic costs of obesity). 
 191. See Press Release, White House, Remarks by the First Lady at National League 
of Cities Conference (Mar. 15, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/03/15/remarks-first-lady-national-league-cities-conference 
(delineating how childhood obesity adversely impacts balancing the budget and 
allowing economic growth in communities).  
 192. See also supra Part II.B.3 (analyzing the Healthy Food Ordinance under the 
fourth step of Central Hudson and finding that the requirements are not more 
extensive than necessary; therefore, the Ordinance is a narrowly tailored way to 
achieve the government’s interest in protecting children’s health). 
 193. HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471.1 (clarifying that the Ordinance solely aims at 
improving the eating habits of children in San Francisco). 
 194. Id. 
 195. See supra Part II.B.3 (explaining that the Ordinance is not overly burdensome 
because it is restricted to children’s meals). 
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accordingly, the Ordinance would not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.196 
III. WHAT IS NEXT?  RESPONSE TO THE ORDINANCE AND FUTURE 
IMPLICATIONS 
A. National Impact:  Additional Legal Measures and Industry Changes 
Following the passage of the Ordinance, analogous regulations 
have appeared, foreshadowing the national impact this ban could 
have on fast food chains and on the public health.197  In New York 
City—another city that has been aggressive in legislating to combat 
obesity—Councilman Leroy Comrie proposed to enact a similar ban 
with even stricter health requirements.198  Similarly, in a class action 
lawsuit, the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI) sued 
McDonald’s for using Happy Meal toys to unlawfully exploit 
children’s inability to recognize predatory advertising practices.199  If 
CSPI prevails, the ban on toys in certain kids’ meals could become a 
nationwide standard.200 
In response to the Ordinance and mounting pressures, companies 
within the fast food industry have taken divergent approaches.  For 
example, following the enactment of the toy bans in San Francisco 
and Santa Clara, Jack in the Box announced that it would not only 
start providing healthier kids’ meal options but that it would also 
                                                          
 196. Rational basis is a more flexible standard of review; therefore, it is not 
necessary to analyze the Ordinance under this test because it likely survives strict 
scrutiny.  See supra Part I.C.3 (suggesting that the Ordinance would pass strict 
scrutiny because it advances compelling interests and is narrowly tailored).  See 
generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1282 
(2007) (describing rational basis review as more highly deferential than strict 
scrutiny). 
 197. See Fried, supra note 189 (clarifying that San Francisco was not the first region 
to restrict toy marketing by fast food restaurants and suggesting similar ordinances 
may appear nationwide). 
 198. See Julie Gunlock, New York Introduces the Un-Happy Meal, NAT’L REV. ONLINE 
(Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/263974/new-york-
introduces-un-happy-meal-julie-gunlock (criticizing New York’s proposed standards, 
which are modeled after San Francisco’s Healthy Food Ordinance). 
 199. See Amended Class Action Complaint at 1–2, Parham v. McDonald’s Corp., 
No. CGC-10-506178 (S.F. Cty. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2011) (accusing McDonald’s of using 
deceptive and unfair advertising practices to bait children and to obtain an unfair 
advantage over its competitors who choose not to give away toys); see also Dan Levine, 
McDonald’s vs. Mom in Happy Meal Lawsuit, MSNBC.COM (Apr. 19, 2011, 12:30 PM), 
http://forum.purseblog.com/up-to-the-minute/mcdonalds-vs-mom-in-happy-meal-
lawsuit-677605.html (explaining that McDonald’s removed the suit to federal court 
in California). 
 200. See Fried, supra note 189 (suggesting that CSPI would like the toy ban to 
eventually be implemented nationwide).  
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discontinue selling toys with meals for children.201  
Although McDonald’s denies being influenced by the passage of 
the Healthy Food Ordinance or these other legal measures,202 it made 
subsequent changes to its Happy Meal offerings.203  In July 2011, 
McDonald’s announced that it will not only serve apple slices without 
the previously included caramel sauce, but apples will be a default 
side in all Happy Meals.204  French fries will continue to come as a 
default item, but the serving size will be reduced.205  Additionally, fat-
free chocolate milk and one-percent-fat white milk will be offered as 
drink options.206  McDonald’s has also promised to continue reducing 
sodium, sugars, saturated fat, and calories, as well as introduce more 
fruit and vegetable options over the next several years.207 
Most significantly, McDonald’s announced—the day before the 
Ordinance was to go into effect—that parents can still buy toys for 
their children at each of the nineteen McDonald’s locations in San 
Francisco, regardless of whether the meal complies with the 
Ordinance.208  Parents need only pay an extra ten cents, which will be 
donated to charity.209  The actions taken by McDonald’s underscore 
                                                          
 201. See Lisa Jennings, Jack in the Box Makes Big Menu Changes, NATION’S 
RESTAURANT NEWS (June 17, 2011), http://nrn.com/article/jack-box-makes-big-
menu-changes (noting that despite the restaurant’s denial that it was being 
motivated by outside pressures, Jack in the Box would end its twenty-year practice of 
providing toys in kids’ meals and would also add healthier menu alternatives).  
 202. See Rexrode, supra note 32 (revealing that despite these changes occurring 
amidst recent regulations, such as the Healthy Food Ordinance, Cindy Goody, the 
senior director of nutrition for McDonald’s, denies the changes are related to the 
Ordinance and instead asserts they are a response to customers requesting healthier 
choices).   
 203. See Press Release, McDonald’s, McDonald’s USA:  Commitments to Offer 
Improved Nutrition Choices (July 26, 2011) [hereinafter McDonald’s Press Release], 
available at http://www.aboutmcdonalds.com/mcd/newsroom/electronic_ 
press_kits/mcdonalds_usa_commitments_to_offer_improved_nutrition_choices.html 
(outlining its plan to provide more wholesome kids’ meals); see also Happy Meal Gets a 
Makeover, supra note 131 (asserting that the changes to Happy Meals are scheduled to 
begin in September 2011, with all 14,000 McDonald’s chains in the United States to 
adopt this plan by the first quarter of 2012).   
 204. See McDonald’s Press Release, supra note 203 (disclosing that McDonald’s is 
also exploring alternatives to apples, such as other forms of produce and low-fat dairy 
items).  
 205. See id. (explaining that customers may request an extra bag of apples as an 
alternative side to French fries).  
 206. See id. (estimating that these changes will decrease the calories in Happy 
Meals by as much as twenty percent).  
 207. See id. (announcing that McDonald’s plans to reduce the sodium by fifteen 
percent on all menu items by 2015 and adjust serving sizes to decrease added sugars, 
saturated fat, and calories by 2020). 
 208. See Stephanie Strom, For A Dime, McDonald’s Beats a Toy Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
1, 2011, at B5 (explaining that McDonald’s will continue to make toys available to 
customers because the company feels Happy Meals would not have the same appeal 
without the trinkets). 
 209. Id. 
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its attempt to circumvent the restrictions of the Ordinance.210  While 
some health experts lament this as a loss for health advocates in the 
battle against childhood obesity and diabetes,211 health officials in San 
Francisco assert that this is just the beginning of the government’s 
attempts to strengthen the Ordinance and improve children’s 
health.212   
B. Potential Regulatory Responses 
San Francisco’s most successful response to the McDonald’s Happy 
Meal changes would be to implement economic regulations on toys 
sold separately from kids’ meals.  According to the Supreme Court in 
Nebbia v. New York,213 “a state is free to adopt whatever economic 
policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to 
enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose,”214 as long as 
it is not “unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.”215  The power to 
impose a price differential on a product was extended to cities in 
People v. Cook.216  There, the court validated New York City’s authority 
to impose a price differential on cigarettes, depending upon their tar 
and nicotine content.217  It asserted that a city’s exercise of its police 
powers is valid as long as the regulation is reasonably related to 
promoting the public health, and the means of enforcement do not 
exceed the limits of the city’s police powers.218 
1. Setting a price floor 
Following the principles established in Nebbia and Cook, San 
                                                          
 210. See S.F., CAL., HEALTH CODE art. 8, § 471.4 (2011), available at 
http://www.amlegal.com/library/ca/sfrancisco.shtml (follow “Health Code” 
hyperlink; then follow “Article 8:  Food and Food Products” hyperlink) (prohibiting 
the provision of a free toy incentive with kids’ meals that do not meet the established 
nutritional requirements). 
 211. See Strom, supra note 208 (“In the battle over children’s health, this is a win 
for obesity and diabetes.”). 
 212. Dr. Rajiv Bhatia, director of occupational and environmental health at San 
Francisco’s Department of Public Health, asserted that the city was going to learn 
from McDonald’s response and “do what’s necessary to improve regulation.”  Id. 
 213. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
 214. Id. at 537. 
 215. Id. at 525.  Indeed, states have only acquired greater latitude to implement 
economic regulations since the Court’s decision in Nebbia and the end of the Lochner 
era.  See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (“[I]t is for the 
legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the new 
[regulation].”). 
 216. 312 N.E.2d 452 (N.Y. 1974). 
 217. Id. at 455–56 (finding that the New York State Constitution’s “home rule” 
provision properly granted municipalities, like New York City, the authority to 
exercise police powers). 
 218. Id.  
ETOW.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)  6/14/2012  7:09 PM 
1538 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:1503 
Francisco could implement a statute fixing a minimum price at which 
toys must be sold if the kids’ meals they accompany do not meet the 
Ordinance’s health requirements.219  A law mandating that toys 
accompanying unhealthy kids’ meals be sold at fair market value 
would help thwart companies, like McDonald’s, from giving away toys 
virtually for free.  For the following reasons, this regulation would 
meet all the requirements outlined in Nebbia and Cook, thereby 
constituting a valid exercise of police power. 
First, California’s Constitution has explicitly delegated the 
authority to exercise police powers to cities, like San Francisco.220  
This is the preliminary step in analyzing the legality of a local law, 
and it was the first issue the court addressed in Cook.221  Second, a law 
implementing a price differential on toys based on the nutritional 
content of the kids’ meals they accompany closely parallels the law 
upheld in Cook, which imposed a price differential on cigarettes 
based upon their tar and nicotine content.222  Accordingly, a court 
would likely find that a regulation establishing the price of toys in 
kids’ meals falls well within the realm of San Francisco’s delegated 
police powers—it would not infringe upon any other constitutional 
or general law, and the California State Legislature has not 
preempted San Francisco’s ability to exercise this power.223 
Third, the implementation of a price floor is reasonably related to 
San Francisco’s interest in promoting its citizens’ health and well-
being.  As discussed in the beginning of this Comment, toys and 
other incentive items offered with kids’ meals are successful 
marketing tactics utilized by fast food companies to attract child 
consumers.224  And while there are numerous contributing factors to 
the obesity epidemic, research has established that high-calorie meals 
consumed outside the home are at least partially responsible.225  
Consequently, it is reasonable for San Francisco to conclude that 
higher prices for toys purchased in conjunction with unhealthy kids’ 
                                                          
 219. For example, San Francisco could increase the price to fair market value or at 
least to the cost of production of these toys. 
 220. See CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 7 (“A county or city may make and enforce within its 
limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict 
with general laws.”). 
 221. See Cook, 312 N.E.2d at 455–56 (citing the New York State Constitution’s 
“home rule” provision as expressly granting localities police powers). 
 222. Id. 
 223. See id. at 455 (identifying these issues as two potential limitations on a city’s 
police power). 
 224. Supra Part I.A.3. 
 225. See Hill, supra note 4, at 110 (suggesting that the obesity epidemic can be 
partially attributed to the high fat and high sugar menu offerings at fast food 
restaurants and the more recent trend toward super-sized “extra value” meals). 
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meals would result in lower rates of obesity.226  A local law requiring 
companies to sell toys in kids’ meals at fair market value or at the cost 
of production, therefore, would not exceed San Francisco’s police 
powers. 
2. Instituting an excise tax 
San Francisco could also implement a tax on toys sold in 
conjunction with meals that do not meet the health standards of the 
Ordinance.  Under California law, charter cities,227 like San Francisco, 
have the authority to “make and enforce all ordinances and 
regulations in respect to municipal affairs.”228  Because local taxes fall 
under the umbrella of “municipal affairs,”229 cities may institute a 
local tax as long as the tax is not restricted by its own charter or 
preempted by state law.230  Here, neither California state law nor San 
Francisco local law prohibits San Francisco from imposing an excise 
tax on toys in kids’ meals.231  Therefore, San Francisco could tax 
restaurants selling toys in conjunction with unhealthy kids’ meals that 
do not meet the health requirements imposed by the Ordinance. 
Moreover, a “sin tax” to discourage the consumption of unhealthy 
foods and beverages is not a new idea to California.232  In the past few 
                                                          
 226. Cf. Cook, 312 N.E.2d at 455 (explaining the rationale behind New York’s 
law—to force consumers to pay higher retail prices for more harmful cigarettes—and 
finding it reasonably related to the city’s interest in ensuring its citizens’ health).   
 227. Some cities adopt a city charter, which is like a constitution for local affairs.  
See Miller v. City of Sacramento, 136 Cal. Rptr. 315, 318 (Ct. App. 1977) (defining 
city charters). 
 228. CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 5. 
 229. See W. Coast Adver. Co. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 95 P.2d 138, 143 (Cal. 1939) 
(“No doubt is entertained upon the proposition that the levy of taxes by a 
municipality for revenue purposes, including license taxes, is strictly a municipal 
affair.”). 
 230. See Roble Vista Assocs. v. Bacon, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 295, 297 (Ct. App. 2002) 
(conveying that preemption exists when a local law attempts to legislate in an area 
that is explicitly or implicitly regulated by state law). 
 231. An excise tax is typically imposed on a business selling a commodity related 
to a specific act or the enjoyment of a privilege, such as smoking cigarettes.  See 
United States v. 4,432 Mastercases of Cigarettes, More or Less, 448 F.3d 1168, 1184–
85 (9th Cir. 2006) (classifying the California cigarette tax law under question as an 
excise tax). 
 232. See Kim Geiger & Tom Hamburger, States Poised to Become New Battleground in 
Soda Tax Wars, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2010, at A22 (reporting California legislators’ 
attempt to pass a bill taxing soda consumption in light of studies revealing the strong 
correlation between sugary soda consumption and obesity).  While the efforts to 
implement a statewide soda tax ultimately failed, new research from the University of 
California, San Francisco, and Columbia University seems to have breathed new life 
into the debate.  Their research revealed that a national tax on soda would not only 
raise $13 billion each year but save taxpayers $17 billion from decreased medical 
expenditures.  Karen Kaplan, Soda Tax Could Prevent 26,000 Premature Deaths, Study 
Finds, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/10/news/la-
heb-soda-tax-diabetes-obesity-20120110.   
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years, California and a dozen other states have considered 
restructuring their taxes on soft drinks because of the strong 
evidence linking soda drinkers with poor health conditions.233  The 
health goals behind taxing sugary beverages are twofold:  (1) the tax 
reduces consumption; and (2) the tax raises revenue to help fund 
school health programs, build parks, and support other recreational 
activities.234  Similarly, a tax on toys accompanying unhealthy kids’ 
meals would not only prevent companies from circumventing the 
Ordinance, but it would also raise money to help fund health 
education programs in San Francisco. 
C. Implications of the Ordinance and Future Measures 
The Healthy Food Ordinance epitomizes the progression toward 
cleverer, yet more invasive, attempts to regulate obesity, raising 
important issues pertaining to the future of these regulations.  From 
point-of-purchase labeling requirements at fast food and big chain 
restaurants,235 to soda taxes,236 bans on trans fats,237 fast food zoning 
ordinances,238 and even restrictions on food stamps,239 legislation 
aimed at curtailing obesity has become particularly pervasive in 
                                                          
 233. In 2010, Colorado passed a bill to tax soft drinks.  See Geiger & Hamburger, 
supra note 232 (noting that 12 states are considering altering taxes on soft drinks, 
and that Colorado’s legislature recently passed a bill changing the tax treatment of 
such beverages). 
 234. Id. 
 235. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 4205, 
124 Stat. 119, 573–74 (2010) (requiring restaurants with twenty or more locations to 
display calorie information for food items on their menus and menu boards, 
including drive-through menu boards). 
 236. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the growing prevalence of “sin taxes” on soft 
drinks); see also Kelly D. Brownell & Thomas R. Frieden, Ounces of Prevention—The 
Public Policy Case for Taxes on Sugared Beverages, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1805, 1805 
(2009) (indicating that forty states already have some sort of sugary beverage tax and 
that several of these states are considering increasing this tax in response to the 
obesity epidemic). 
 237. See, e.g., Thomas J. Lueck & Kim Severson, New York Bans Most Trans Fats in 
Restaurants, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2006, at A1 (declaring New York as the first city in the 
United States to ban restaurants’ use of trans fats). 
 238. See generally JULIE SAMIA MAIR ET AL., THE USE OF ZONING TO RESTRICT FAST 
FOOD OUTLETS:  A POTENTIAL STRATEGY TO COMBAT OBESITY 1–4 (2005), available at 
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Zoning%20Fast%20Food%20Outlets.pdf 
(discussing existing zoning laws that limit the presence of fast food restaurants and 
current case law).   
 239. In October 2010, Mayor Bloomberg requested permission from the federal 
government to prevent 1.7 million New Yorkers in the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP) from purchasing sugar-sweetened beverages with their 
food stamps for a two-year period to study whether it would positively impact health.  
Anemona Hartocollis, Food Stamps As New Front in Soda Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2010, 
at A1.  Similarly, Minnesota sought federal permission in 2004 to implement a ban 
disallowing food-stamp recipients from purchasing junk food—a request ultimately 
denied by the Department of Agriculture.  Id. at A34. 
ETOW.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)  6/14/2012  7:09 PM 
2012] THE HEALTHY FOOD INCENTIVES ORDINANCE 1541 
recent years.  The reformation of food in the school setting has also 
been at the forefront of this movement as numerous states have 
implemented regulations prohibiting the sale of soft drinks on school 
campuses.240  According to a study, during the 2009–2010 school year, 
fourteen states banned soda in school vending machines, and 
nineteen states disallowed the sale of soda in school cafeterias.241  In 
2003, Arkansas adopted an unprecedented approach to children’s 
health by passing an act banning all vending machines from 
elementary schools and requiring schools to provide parents with 
report cards of their child’s body mass index (BMI), their child’s BMI 
percentile by age, and an explanation of the health impacts related to 
BMI, eating habits, and physical activity.242  Most recently, the Obama 
Administration enacted the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010,243 
which sets new nutrition standards for school lunches.244 
While these measures aimed at obesity—including the Ordinance 
and its possible responses—offer innovative ways to potentially 
alleviate this pressing health problem, they undoubtedly raise 
concerns of a paternalistic slippery slope.  For example, when it 
comes to taxing soft drinks or even toys in kids’ meals, where would 
governments draw the line?  In light of increased efforts to address 
obesity and other health-related diseases, it would not be beyond the 
realm of possibility for such “sin taxes” to next extend to the grocery 
store—increasing the price of products deemed to be excessive in fat, 
sugar, or calories—or even to activities unrelated to food 
consumption.  In fact, New York Assemblyman Felix Ortiz has already 
proposed a bill seeking to tax pastimes generally associated with 
sedentary lifestyles, including movie tickets, video games, and even 
DVD rentals.245  To an even greater extreme, Eric Topol, Former 
Chief of Cardiology at the Cleveland Clinic, believes that slender 
                                                          
 240. Nicole Ostrow, Banning Sugary Soda from School Fails to Cut Teen Consumption, 
Study Finds, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 7, 2011, 4:00 PM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-07/banning-sugary-soda-from-schools-
fails-to-cut-teen-consumption.html (noting that a number of states have implemented 
bans on soft drinks in school, but that programs banning all sugary drinks were more 
effective at reducing overall consumption of calorie-laden beverages). 
 241. Id. 
 242. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-7-135 (West 2011). 
 243. Pub. L. No. 111-296, 124 Stat. 3183 (2010). 
 244. In December 2010, the White House announced the passage of the Healthy, 
Hunger-Free Kids Act, which, like the Healthy Food Ordinance, foreshadows the 
movement toward increased government intervention because of parents’ inabilities 
to ensure that their children consume healthful foods.  Penny Starr, Michelle Obama 
on Deciding What Kids Eat:  “We Can’t Just Leave it Up to the Parents,” CNSNEWS.COM 
(Dec. 13, 2010), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/michelle-obama-deciding-what-
kids-eat-we-can-t-just-leave-it-parents. 
 245. Ceci Connolly, Public Policy Targeting Obesity, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2003, at A1. 
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taxpayers should receive a tax credit while “the people ruining our 
health care economics would pay the standard tax.”246  And while the 
reality of such legislation ever becoming law certainly appears 
unfathomable, it is unlikely that parents and their children twenty-
five years ago imagined that the toys in their kids’ meals would one 
day be a point of contention and, in some cities, banned for health 
reasons. 
CONCLUSION 
The questions and subsequent analysis pertaining to the Healthy 
Food Ordinance’s constitutionality reveal its expansive reach and 
expose pivotal implications for the future of anti-obesity laws and 
regulations.  Professor Mark Hall adeptly captured the complexity of 
public health issues, like obesity, observing:  “[v]iewed from one 
perspective, these are issues of individual choice.  Viewed from 
another perspective, however, each of these is a public health 
problem, one that justifies coercive government intervention to 
prevent individuals’ choices from harming themselves or others.”247  
Indeed, the Healthy Food Ordinance falls within this gray area.  On 
one hand, it embodies a creative solution to the food industry’s 
failure to adopt effective self-regulations and prior anti-obesity 
measures’ constitutional pitfalls.  Yet, on the other, the Ordinance 
evokes paternalistic concerns regarding our most basic civil liberties. 
Regardless of which perspective the Ordinance should be viewed 
from, however, the Healthy Food Ordinance seriously calls into 
question the constitutional framework that ensures our protected 
liberties.  There is something amiss when more invasive measures, 
like the Healthy Food Ordinance, are almost certainly constitutional, 
yet substantially more intrusive than their predecessors, such as bans 
on junk food advertisements, which were stymied by the same 
doctrinal tools.  To tackle a complex issue such as childhood obesity, 
while still preserving civil liberties, it is critical that these legal 
doctrines evolve into a cohesive body of law that produces more 
consistent results in the future. 
                                                          
 246. See id. (reporting Topol’s declaration that if he were a government official, he 
would require each citizen to submit to a weigh-in at the post office every tax day).  
Equally ridiculous was Mississippi State Representative John Read’s proposed bill that 
would require restaurants to refuse service to overweight customers.  Hellmich, supra 
note 174. 
 247. See Mark A. Hall, The Scope and Limits of Public Health Law, 46 PERSPS. IN 
BIOLOGY & MED. S199, S206 (2003) (“Lacking any one specific agent on which to 
focus health improvement strategies, the next best response is to target behaviors 
that will decrease various statistical risk factors.”). 
